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INTRODUCTION 
When President George W. Bush started the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) in response to the 9/11 attacks, the United States legal community 
was as unprepared as the country.1  Bush immediately asserted presidential 
 
*  Professor of Law, Temple University Beasley School of Law; John Edwin Pomfret Fellowship, 
Princeton University; J.D., Yale Law School.  Many thanks for comments on earlier drafts from Jane 
Baron, Steve Burbank, Mary Clark, Lynda Dodd, Jeff Dunoff, Barry Friedman, Amanda Frost, David 
Hoffman, Gia Lee, Greg Mandel, Andy Monroe, Louis Pollak, Bob Reinstein, Theodore Ruger, Jed 
Shugerman, Neil Siegel, Steve Vladeck, participants at American University’s Conference on Judges 
and Judging, and participants at Temple Law School’s Faculty Workshop.  Thanks also for extraordi-
nary research assistance by Mick Alford, Melanie Carter, Allison Gaul, Vicky Killion, Yi Qian, and es-
pecially Sarah Happy and Diana Lin. 
1  NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, at xv–
xvi (2004), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/index.htm; see DOUGLAS J. FEITH, 
WAR AND DECISION: INSIDE THE PENTAGON AT THE DAWN OF THE WAR ON TERRORISM 17 (2008) 
(“[By September 13,] the President’s advisers agreed that we were at war.  Still, we all had a way to go 
to understand what kind of war we were in and how the United States should fight it.”); JOHN LEWIS 
GADDIS, SURPRISE, SECURITY, AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 80 (2004) (“It was not just the Twin 
Towers that collapsed on the morning of September 11, 2001: so too did some of [America’s] most fun-
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wartime prerogatives and drew analogies to the last great war, World War 
II.2  Yet as the Bush Administration designed policies of “executive deten-
tion” and “military commissions,” most civilian lawyers had never heard 
those terms, much less analyzed their constitutional limits.3  In this instance, 
unfamiliarity bred power, as executive lawyers seized political initiative and 
created unforeseen opportunities for abuse.4 
 
damental assumptions about international, national, and personal security.”); JANE MAYER, THE DARK 
SIDE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW THE WAR ON TERROR TURNED INTO A WAR ON AMERICAN IDEALS 34 
(2008) (“[T]o say we’re in a state of war with Al Qaeda . . . set us on a course not only for our interna-
tional response, but also in our domestic constitutional relations. . . .  But there was little or no detailed 
deliberation about long-term consequences.” (quoting Matthew Waxman, special assistant to Condo-
leezza Rice)). 
2  E.g., Remarks at a Ceremony Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of Pearl Harbor in Norfolk, 
Virginia, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1492, 1492–94 (Dec. 07, 2001); Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress 
on the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1140–42 
(Sept. 20, 2001) (“[F]or the past 136 years, the[re] have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sun-
day in 1941. . . .  Americans have known surprise attacks, but never before on thousands of civilians. . . .  
This is the world’s fight.  This is civilization’s fight.”); see also Commencement Address at the United 
States Air Force Academy in Colorado Springs, Colorado, 1 PUB. PAPERS 974, 975 (June 2, 2004) 
(“Like the Second World War, our present conflict began with a ruthless surprise attack on the United 
States.”). 
3  It is hard to convey the inattention to war powers that prevailed before 2001, but I have collected 
two sets of materials to corroborate my personal experience (and ignorance) as a governmental lawyer 
during part of this period.  First, I surveyed four leading casebooks’ treatments of executive detention 
and military commissions from 1990 to 2010.  See infra Appendix A.  These widely used casebooks 
were authored by agenda-setting scholars, and they indicate topics that were taught to the mainstream of 
American law students.  In 2001, none of these casebooks contained any major excerpt or discussion 
concerning military commissions or executive detention except for Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944), and even Korematsu appeared in sections concerning equal protection rather than war pow-
ers until well after 2001.  See infra Appendix A (tabulating results).  Second, I compared law review ar-
ticles from 1991 to 2001 with those from 2001 to 2010.  Combinations of search terms and case names 
revealed that articles about executive detention and military commissions were approximately ten times 
more common in the decade after 9/11 than in the decade before.  See infra Appendix B. 
4  For recent histories of the current conflict, see PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM: RUMSFELD’S 
MEMO AND THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN VALUES 88–90 (2008); IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: 
REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR 16–31 (2007); CLIVE STAFFORD SMITH, EIGHT 
O’CLOCK FERRY TO THE WINDWARD SIDE: SEEKING JUSTICE IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY 36–40 (2007); 
STEVEN T. WAX, KAFKA COMES TO AMERICA: FIGHTING FOR JUSTICE IN THE WAR ON TERROR 318–23 
(2008); John E. Owens, Congressional Acquiescence to Presidentialism in the US “War on Terror”: 
From Bush to Obama, in THE “WAR ON TERROR” AND THE GROWTH OF EXECUTIVE POWER? A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 33 (John E. Owens & Riccardo Pelizzo eds., 2010); and Julian E. Zelizer, 
How Conservatives Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Presidential Power, in THE PRESIDENCY OF 
GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT 15, 36–37 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2010).  Cf. Mary 
L. Dudziak, A Sword and a Shield: The Uses of Law in the Bush Administration, in THE PRESIDENCY OF 
GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT, supra, at 39, 39 (“[W]ithin the [Bush] adminis-
tration, law was not ignored.  Instead, although the president and his advisers feared law as a potential 
threat to the operation of the executive branch, they turned to law as a means of achieving important 
goals.”). 
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A main element of the Bush legal strategy was reliance on cases from 
what I call the “Korematsu era.”5  Every American lawyer knows Koremat-
su v. United States as a discredited precedent.6  Yet conventional wisdom 
has too often viewed Korematsu narrowly as a singular error in Supreme 
Court history concerning the racist internment of United States citizens.7  
That portrayal allowed President Bush’s legal advisers to sideline Koremat-
su’s “negative precedent” as categorically separate from twenty-first-
century events even as the Administration cited other World War II deci-
 
5  See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Korematsu, 
323 U.S. 214; Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); infra Part I.B (discussing these cases as elements of 
the Korematsu era). 
6  E.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the Unit-
ed States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 472 (2010), available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg67622/pdf/CHRG-111shrg67622.pdf (statement of Elena 
Kagan, U.S. Solicitor Gen. & Supreme Court Nominee) (singling out Korematsu as a “relatively recent 
decision . . . that was poorly reasoned and that is unlikely to come before the Court again”); GEOFFREY 
R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 297–310 (2004) (“Korematsu has become a constitutional pariah.”); Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Ter-
ror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2077 (2007) (describing Korematsu as a reviled precedent); Eugene V. 
Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 531–32 (1945) (criticizing Ko-
rematsu in the strongest of terms); see Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 953 (2000) (Scalia, J. dissent-
ing) (comparing Korematsu to Dred Scott); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 400 
(2011) (“[I]t appears that at no time since September 11 has any U.S. government lawyer publicly used 
the Korematsu decision as precedent in defending executive detention decisions.”). 
7  See infra Appendix A (summarizing casebook treatment of Korematsu as a case about racial dis-
crimination rather than war powers); see also ERIC L. MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION: THE HUNT FOR 
JAPANESE AMERICAN DISLOYALTY IN WORLD WAR II 2 (2007) [hereinafter MULLER, AMERICAN 
INQUISITION] (describing Japanese-American internment as “a system of legalized racial oppression”); 
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST AND WORST IN AMERICAN LAW 77 (1997) 
(“[Korematsu’s] racist approach is plainly inconsistent with the . . . law since Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.”); Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment: The Supreme Court’s Ko-
rematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175, 239 (1945) (“[Korematsu] resulted in the 
establishment of an extremely weak standard of review of the justifiability of measures of racial discrim-
ination . . . for the emergencies of peace as well as of war.”); Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1938 (2003) (“[W]hat we remember about the Supreme Court’s internment 
cases is . . . the fact of racism, the failures of legal process, the corrosive effects of gross institutional 
responses.”); Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi and the Invasion Evasion, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2010) 
(referencing the Supreme Court’s acknowledgment that Korematsu’s approval of racial exclusion was an 
“error” and a “fail[ure] to detect an illegitimate racial classification” (quoting Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995))). 
To be sure, this conventional preoccupation with Korematsu’s racism continues to emphasize impor-
tant egalitarian norms, and its dominant focus has never been exclusive within the academy.  For impor-
tant exceptions, see Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2077 (analyzing Korematsu as a “tainted 
precedent” in the context of executive detention); Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency 
Contexts Without Emergency Powers: The United States’ Constitutional Approach to Rights During 
Wartime, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 311 (2004) (analyzing Korematsu’s “lessons about the inability of 
courts during wartime to provide any check on political excesses, particularly those jointly endorsed by 
the executive and legislature”); and Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, 
and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 1000 (1999) (discussing Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and 
judicial deference). 
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sions as “good law” to support unrestrained executive power.8  Unlike the 
government’s actions in Korematsu, modern detention policies do not typi-
cally involve United States citizens, explicit racial classifications, wholesale 
detention, or restraint in the American homeland.  For lawyers who focus 
 
8  Several important Bush Administration memos cite Korematsu-era cases.  See, e.g., Memorandum 
from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Timothy Flanigan, 
Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 
3, 5 (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) (relying on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 
763 (1950), to argue that the President has “broad constitutional authority to use military force in re-
sponse to threats to the national security”); Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney 
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, and Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, and William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 
33 (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memomilitaryforcecombatus10232001.
pdf (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), to claim that enemies should not receive certain basic 
constitutional rights and that “United States citizenship may not negate the possibility . . . [of] legal sta-
tus [as] an enemy”); Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 5–9, 13, 17, 19–21 (Nov. 6, 2001) [he-
reinafter Military Commissions Memo], available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-
millcommfinal.pdf (relying on Quirin, Eisentrager, and Yamashita to argue against the restriction of 
military commissions); Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office 
of Legal Counsel, and John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Wil-
liam J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Habeas Memo], in THE 
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra, at 29, 29–33 (analyzing Eisentrager and Yama-
shita as authority for denying jurisdiction over the habeas petitions of detainees at Guantánamo Bay); 
Draft Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, and 
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, 
Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Treaties Memo], in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU 
GHRAIB, supra, at 38, 76 (citing Quirin as authority for trying members of al Qaeda and the Taliban be-
fore military courts under the laws of war ); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., 
Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. (Feb. 26, 2002), in THE 
TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB, supra, at 144, 147–50, 163 (citing Quirin, Eisentrager, 
and Yamashita to assert that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to trials in military 
tribunals or to aliens captured outside of the United States and involuntarily transported into the United 
States for trial); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def. 3 (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.justice.
gov/opa/documents/memorandumpresidentpower03132002.pdf (relying on Eisentrager to claim that 
courts should defer to the President when he is acting as Commander in Chief); Memorandum from Pa-
trick Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs 3, 5–7, 9–10, 14, 16, 18–19 (Apr. 8, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memojusticeauthorizationact0482002.pdf (citing Eisentrager, Quirin, 
and Yamashita to argue that the President enjoys authority to order military action, detain individuals 
involved in terrorist acts, and establish military commissions); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assis-
tant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John Ashcroft, Attorney Gen., Dep’t of Justice 4–6 
(June 8, 2002), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/torturingdemocracy/documents/20020608.
pdf (relying on Quirin to support the President’s authority to seize and detain enemy combatants); and 
Memorandum from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 12 (Mar. 18, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2004/
gc4mar18.pdf (citing Quirin to argue that spies are unlawful enemy combatants).  For citations to go-
vernmental briefs that invoke Korematsu-era precedents, see infra note 144. 
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on those differences, any comparison between modern detention and the in-
ternment in Korematsu must seem wildly exaggerated.9 
This Article offers a different view of Korematsu with correspondingly 
different implications.  By revisiting Korematsu’s historical context, I sug-
gest that the decision extends beyond its racist facts and embodies a general 
theory of presidential war powers.  Controversies continue today over the 
President’s authority to fight terrorism and pursue American policy.  And 
this Article’s hindsight about precedents from the Roosevelt, Truman, and 
Bush Administrations may offer valuable foresight about what is yet to 
come. 
The Article proceeds in three steps.  Part I applies a mix of doctrine 
and history to identify the Korematsu era as a category of Supreme Court 
cases and thereby disputes narrow conventions about Korematsu’s meaning.  
Commonalities among Korematsu and other mid-century precedents con-
cerning executive detention and military commissions show that these cases 
all implemented Korematsu’s distinctive view of executive authority.  As 
with the “Lochner era’s” approach to economic liberty or the “Civil Rights 
era’s” approach to legal equality,10 conceptualizing war power precedents as 
 
9  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 344 (4th Cir. 2003) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in denial of re-
hearing en banc) (“There is not the slightest resemblance of a foreign battlefield detention to the roundly 
and properly discredited mass arrest and detention of Japanese–Americans in California in Koremat-
su.”); STONE, supra note 6, at 551 (“President Bush deserves credit for his response to the risk of hostile 
public reactions against Muslims and Muslim Americans.  The contrast with . . . Roosevelt’s treatment 
of Japanese Americans is striking.  This is a good example of lessons learned.”). 
10  Cf. Gudridge, supra note 7, at 1934 (“Korematsu is an infernal baseline.  Like Lochner, Dred 
Scott, and Plessy, it marks what we hope not to repeat . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).  For debates about the 
Lochner era and its meaning, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 222–23 (2004); HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE 
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 196–97, 205 (1993); and Cass R. 
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1985) (“Almost eighty years since the case 
was decided, the lesson of the Lochner period has yet to be settled.”).  Compare RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 274–82 (1989) (defending Loch-
ner-style review for eminent domain), with WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME 
COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 123–25 (1988) (“Lochner has become in modern times a . . . negative touch-
stone.  Along with Dred Scott, it is our foremost reference case for describing the Court’s malfunction-
ing. . . .  We speak of ‘lochnerizing’ when we wish to imply that judges substitute their policy 
preferences for those of the legislature.”), and David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 373, 373–75 (2003) (“Lochner v New York would probably win the prize, if there were one, for 
the most widely reviled decision of the last hundred years. . . .  [T]he Lochner-era Court acted defensibly 
in recognizing freedom of contract but indefensibly in exalting it.”). 
Other scholarship exemplifies debates over the Civil Rights era.  See RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST 
PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS 13–15 (2007) (analyzing what was sacrificed in making Brown a focal point 
for civil rights litigation); JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL BATTLES OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 113–21 (2004) (offering a firsthand account of twentieth-century civil rights 
litigation); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
27–29 (2007) (discussing Brown’s complex relationship to civil rights movements and social change). 
Because my use of “Korematsu era” depends on analogies to the Lochner and civil rights eras, I 
should say explicitly that none of these terms identifies a group of cases that was precisely or self-
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a distinct Korematsu “era” can make a real difference for legal culture and 
judicial results, augmenting lawyers’ litigative vocabulary and offering dis-
tinct perspectives on past and future problems.11 
Analysis of the Court’s votes, language, and context12 shows that the 
originally dominant feature of Korematsu-era case law was not racism but a 
permissive approach to asserted military necessity and unsupervised presi-
dential activity.  Korematsu’s sixty-five-year-old bigotry, which so deeply 
offends modern morals, was secondary to the Court’s judgments about war 
powers and executive deference. 
In addition to descriptively synthesizing an era of cases applying high 
deference to asserted military necessity, Part I uses subsequent history to 
show that the Korematsu era has—apart from issues of racism—earned its 
eponymous place in the legal hall of shame.  With each passing decade, Ko-
rematsu-era case law has become less defensible and authoritative.  How-
ever, even as Korematsu’s significance has waned as a precedent 
concerning race and equal protection, the Korematsu era remains highly re-
levant to a certain type of war powers case: “Youngstown One” decisions 
where Congress has approved the presidential policy under review.13 
Part II applies my revisionist perspective14 to the recent past, docu-
menting how Bush Administration lawyers used Korematsu-era precedents 
 
consciously defined at the time.  Instead, my goal is to collect an open set of decisions that present-day 
observers can recognize by reference to a cluster of important legal principles.  See infra Part I.A–B (de-
tailing the Korematsu era’s organizing themes). 
11  Cf. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 
85 B.U. L. REV. 677, 682–712 (2005) (discussing how Lochner came to symbolize the entire jurispru-
dential period between 1897 and 1937 and is an established element of the constitutional canon: 
“[L]egal materials and legal conventions . . . offer sufficient flexibility to allow constitutional argument 
to be a site for political and social struggle.  Through these struggles, the internal conventions of consti-
tutional argument and the constitutional common sense of a particular historical period are reshaped.”). 
12  See JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF JUSTICE 
WILEY RUTLEDGE 254–55 (2004) (examining the Court’s response to perceived military necessity in 
Korematsu); LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 143 (2005) (highlighting executive deception of the judiciary in Koremat-
su); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 
111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1304 (2002) (contending that Korematsu’s precedential force has been diminished 
by subsequent events); Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-emergency Constitution, 
113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1802 (2004) (describing commentators’ efforts to “square the circle that [Justice 
Jackson in Korematsu] left unsquared”); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil 
Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 307 (exploring Korematsu as a retroactively excoriated 
decision). 
13  See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
14  See James M. McPherson, Revisionist Historians, PERSP. ON HIST., Sept. 2003, at 5, 5 (“The un-
ending quest of historians for understanding the past—that is, ‘revisionism’—is what makes history vital 
and meaningful.”).  Such analysis shares nothing with “revisionist histories” that deny the Holocaust and 
other atrocities.  HENRY ROUSSO, THE VICHY SYNDROME: HISTORY AND MEMORY IN FRANCE SINCE 
1944, at 151 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1987) (“Revisionism, however, 
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to bolster theories of Article II and the unitary executive.15  Expansive theo-
ries of executive power have sometimes been derided as lawless or even ar-
rogant.16  Yet I suggest that some of the Bush Administration’s supporting 
precedents were facially plausible even though they were ultimately re-
jected.17  Because few modern lawyers would defend Korematsu itself, pres-
idential advisers relied on other Korematsu-era cases that embodied the 
same stance toward presidential power without Korematsu’s racist taint.18  
In effect, however, Korematsu-era precedents were a constitutional time 
capsule from the distant and forgotten past.  When the Bush Administration 
had occasion to invoke such authorities, they had become antiquated, inef-
fective, and even dangerous. 
From this Article’s viewpoint, the diminution of Korematsu-era prece-
dents’ doctrinal force is a major theme in recent jurisprudence.  Since 2004, 
the Supreme Court has issued a historically unmatched number of decisions 
limiting executive war powers.19  Each of these cases has been decided nar-
rowly, on specific legal grounds, with little effort to explicitly contradict 
Korematsu-era precedents or upset the constitutional status quo.20  Nonethe-
less, I propose that the Court’s recent decisions undermine the Korematsu 
era’s most basic principle: that courts are institutionally unable to second-
 
usually refers to a normal phase in the evolution of historical scholarship, and I prefer to call those who 
would deny the existence of the Holocaust ‘negationists’ . . . .”). 
15  Compare CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 48, 57–59, 124–25 (2007) (criticizing the origins and applica-
tion of the unitary executive theory), with JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF 
EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH 419–21 (2009) (defending such 
theories). 
16  E.g., DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 
162, 162 (2007); David Cole, The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 
59 STAN. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (2007) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY (2006)); W. Bradley Wendel, Deference to Clients 
and Obedience to Law: The Ethics of the Torture Lawyers (A Response to Professor Hatfield), 104 NW. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 58, 70 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/29/
LRColl2009n29Wendel.pdf (“The right way to criticize John Yoo, Jay Bybee, Stephen Bradbury, and 
other lawyers in the Bush [Office of Legal Counsel] is with reference to the value of legality.  In these 
terms, their advice was an unmitigated fiasco.”). 
17  See infra Part II. 
18  See supra note 8 (collecting examples of reliance on Korematsu-era cases).  To be clear, I do not 
argue that Bush Administration lawyers would have changed their substantive arguments if Korematsu-
era precedents had been more fully understood.  Cf. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW 
AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 212 (2007) (“[T]he [Bush] administration’s concep-
tion of presidential power had a kind of theological significance that often trumped political conse-
quences.”).  At most, presidential lawyers might have had to make their arguments to a better informed 
audience with better fortified resistance. 
19  See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
20  See infra Part II.B (discussing these holdings in detail); cf. BENJAMIN WITTES, LAW AND THE 
LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF TERROR 105–13 (2008) (offering a like-minded 
analysis of GWOT cases decided before 2008). 
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guess presidential claims of military necessity.  Even as the modern Court 
has focused on doctrinal technicalities, it has repeatedly set aside military 
claims about what is necessary to keep our country safe.  My approach sug-
gests that these rulings mark an important repudiation of the Korematsu era, 
which might thereby guard against future executive abuse. 
Part III explores how this Article’s arguments against the Korematsu 
era might affect modern legal culture.  Correcting abusive executive poli-
cies—whether or not they include racial classifications—requires more than 
shame and regret over past wrongs.  Vigilance against future repetition is 
important, and attorneys have a crucial role to play.  In the twenty-first cen-
tury, one set of lawyers designed and approved policies concerning presi-
dential war powers, another group of lawyers litigated to overturn those 
policies, and yet a third set of lawyers decided who should prevail.21  Future 
war powers controversies will probably follow a similarly law-intensive 
pattern. 
Recent repudiations of Korematsu-era attitudes could offer an impor-
tant defense against future presidential excess, but the Court’s subtle lan-
guage illustrates that “[n]ot every epochal case has come in epochal 
trappings.”22  It can be hard to draw broad lessons from war powers cases 
because—compared to other constitutional topics—such issues arise in fit-
ful clusters and under enormous political pressure.  Every war powers crisis 
seems different from the last, and responsive Presidents will use every 
available means to undermine limits on their authority.23 
With a different President and several new Justices, the next decade 
could influence how future generations of lawyers and judges comprehend 
separation of powers and wartime prerogatives.  And if the GWOT prece-
dents’ meaning is up for grabs, now may be just the time to recognize and 
explain the Court’s rejection of the Korematsu era.  As a matter of legal cul-
 
21  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 69 (“[T]he [Bush] administration has been strangled by law, 
and since September 11, 2001, this war has been lawyered to death.  The administration has paid atten-
tion to law not necessarily because it wanted to, but rather because it had no choice.”); id. at 81 (“The 
post-Watergate hyper-legalization of warfare . . . had become so ingrained . . . that the very idea of act-
ing extralegally was simply off the table, even in times of crisis.  The President had to do what he had to 
do to protect the country.  And the lawyers had to find some way to make what he did legal.”); KAREN J. 
GREENBERG, THE LEAST WORST PLACE: GUANTANAMO’S FIRST 100 DAYS 44 (2009) (“The legal cloud 
hanging over the Guantanamo mission in these early days was not due to a deficit of lawyers or legal 
analysis. . . .  Arguably, U.S. government lawyers had never had as much impact on policy as they did 
during the first two or three years of the war on terror.”). 
22  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 615 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
23  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“A judge, like an executive adviser, may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous 
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they actually present themselves.”); cf. 
PAUL PIERSON, POLITICS IN TIME: HISTORY, INSTITUTIONS, AND SOCIAL ANALYSIS 30–53 (2004) (dis-
cussing the concept of “political time” in analyzing presidential conduct); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE 
POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 17–32 (1993) (sche-
matizing historical instances of presidential power and authority). 
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ture, Korematsu’s shift from a generally applicable war powers case to a 
narrower case about race demonstrates how the fade of doctrinal memory 
can operate.  If we cannot even today understand the GWOT cases as re-
nouncing Korematsu’s essence, presidential lawyers in the future will more 
easily dismiss such precedents as idiosyncrasies, old cases that should not 
govern new crises.  The characteristic infrequency of such crises means that 
each one will typically involve different facts.  By contrast, if the United 
States were to suffer an attack in the short run, this decade’s jurisprudence 
might be the only chance to avoid past mistakes.  In either event, it is not 
too early to discuss modern steps to reject the Korematsu era; such analysis 
should begin before collective forgetting is complete. 
In American law, great judicial decisions are important because they 
reflect much more than their strict doctrinal holdings.  Iconic cases like Ko-
rematsu, Marbury, Dred Scott, Lochner, Erie, and Brown are unquestiona-
bly important, but their interpretations prompt endless debate and struggle.24  
Although the meanings of these iconic cases are partly determined by other 
judicial decisions, legal commentators and academics can indirectly shape 
doctrinal interpretation as they educate and train each new crop of judges 
and presidential lawyers.  These latter advisers- and jurists-in-training will 
someday determine the authoritative meaning of Korematsu and the GWOT 
as well.  This Article’s historical perspective aspires to help current and fu-
ture generations in confronting their own debates over how judicial and 
presidential powers interact during wartime. 
I. THE KOREMATSU ERA 
My first step is to introduce the Korematsu era and analyze how the pe-
riod as a whole earned its disfavored status.  This Article’s terminological 
model is the Lochner era, in which a single case represents a group of deci-
sions that in turn embody distinct principles of judicial activity.  For the 
Lochner era, the ideas at stake were extreme solicitude for private property 
and judges’ failure to respect governmental policy judgments.25  This Part 
 
24  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); 
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); see 
J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. REV. 869, 878 (1993) (“The 
struggle over meaning is the struggle over the forms and contours of thought . . . .  Those who shape and 
control these grooves, those who succeed in fashioning the tools of understanding of a time and place, 
have enormous power over human beings.”); J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal Canons: An Intro-
duction, in LEGAL CANONS 3, 3–32 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000) (discussing iconic cas-
es’ place in the constitutional canon); Cass R. Sunstein, In Defense of Liberal Education, 43 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 22, 23 (1993) (“[A]ny serious theory of constitutional interpretation must be able to explain why 
Brown was right.  In this sense, Brown is part of the canon of constitutional law.”). 
25  From Lochner through 1937, the Court struck down approximately two hundred economic regu-
lations.  STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 749 (6th ed. 2009); see also Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 
261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923) (invalidating a minimum wage law for women); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 992 
identifies comparably thematic principles for Korematsu-era cases.  Section 
A challenges the conventional account of Korematsu as principally con-
cerning governmental racism and mass internments.  Although Korematsu 
of course involved indefensible discrimination, its context and its precursor 
Hirabayashi clarify that Korematsu was not just a referendum on unconsti-
tutional racism; instead, it was more preoccupied with assertions of execu-
tive power and military necessity.  Section B supports this revisionist 
interpretation by collecting other cases from the 1940s and 1950s that re-
flected Korematsu’s deference toward executive power but did not involve 
racial classifications.  Section C suggests that late twentieth-century events 
undermined the doctrinal authority of Korematsu-era precedents and that 
such cases qualify as disreputable “negative precedents” regardless of Ko-
rematsu’s racism. 
A. A Revisionist History of Korematsu v. United States 
Prior to the GWOT, American law schools had taught Korematsu for 
decades as a case principally about race,26 and it is easy to see why.  As with 
slavery and Jim Crow, the decision to intern more than 70,000 United 
States citizens based on their Japanese ancestry burns at the modern con-
science and illustrates the evils of racial discrimination.27  At first glance, 
Korematsu’s dissenting opinions seem to channel present-day outrage.28  
And the majority’s dicta concerning racial discrimination have led some 
modern courts to cite Korematsu as a precursor of “strict scrutiny” in equal 
protection—despite the fact that only Justice Murphy’s dissent even men-
tioned the words “equal protection.”29 
 
247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating a federal child labor law); supra notes 10–11 (collecting sources that 
analyze Lochner’s meaning). 
26  See supra note 7 (collecting authorities that exemplify this interpretation of Korematsu). 
27  MULLER, AMERICAN INQUISITION, supra note 7, at 21. 
28  The three Korematsu dissents state current orthodoxy.  323 U.S. at 225–26 (Roberts, J., dissent-
ing) (“[Korematsu] is not a case of keeping people off the streets at night as was Hirabayashi v. United 
States, nor a case of temporary exclusion of a citizen from an area for his own safety or that of the com-
munity . . . .  On the contrary, it is the case of convicting a citizen as a punishment for not submitting to 
imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of his ancestry, with-
out evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty . . . .” (citation omitted)); id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissent-
ing) (“This exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and non-alien, from the Pacific 
Coast area on a plea of military necessity . . . goes over the very brink of constitutional power and falls 
into the ugly abyss of racism.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(“[I]f any fundamental assumption underlies our system, it is that guilt is personal and not inherita-
ble. . . .  But here is an attempt to make an otherwise innocent act a crime merely because this prisoner is 
the son of parents as to whom he had no choice, and belongs to a race from which there is no way to re-
sign.”). 
29  Id. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting); cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954) (applying 
equal protection to the federal government for the first time); Sylvia Dev. Corp. v. Calvert Cnty., 
48 F.3d 810, 820 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Korematsu as requiring the most rigid scrutiny in cases involv-
ing racial classifications); Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508, 513 (3d Cir. 1993) (citing Korematsu as au-
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This section claims that standard race-focused interpretations of Kore-
matsu have overshadowed the decision’s relevance to presidential power 
and military necessity.  I do not suggest that Korematsu must be either a 
race case or a war powers case; of course it is both.  What I propose is an 
important shift in emphasis, stressing an aspect of Korematsu that is often 
clouded by the visceral reaction to the decision’s racial discrimination. 
1. Korematsu’s Doctrinal History.—Despite Korematsu’s notoriety, 
some of its history is known only by experts.30  My first project is to show 
that the Justices who decided Korematsu perceived that case differently 
than many modern observers do.  In the 1940s, although race was important 
for some members of the Court, claims of military necessity overwhelmed 
the majority’s hesitation, and even the dissenting Justices were less commit-
ted to modern equal protection than is commonly recognized.31  This specif-
ic contextual evidence about Korematsu is an important starting point for 
reinterpreting the Korematsu era as a whole. 
After the devastation of Pearl Harbor in December 1941, fears spread 
about other attacks that might be supported by spies and saboteurs within 
the United States.32  President Roosevelt responded in February 1942 by au-
thorizing the creation of military areas “from which any or all persons may 
be excluded” and in which “the right of any person to enter, remain in, or 
leave shall be subject to whatever restrictions [designated officials] may 
impose.”33  To implement this order, Lieutenant General DeWitt split the 
entire Pacific Coast into military areas.34  Congress then criminalized viola-
tions of any military-area regulations with a maximum punishment of 
$5000 and one year in prison.35 
Beginning on March 27, 1942, DeWitt ordered a “curfew” for alien 
Germans and Italians, and for all persons of Japanese ancestry throughout 
much of Arizona, California, Washington, and Oregon.36  This was no ordi-
nary curfew to keep people off the streets.  DeWitt’s order was closer to 
 
thority for the fact that strict scrutiny has generally been applied to equal protection claims involving 
racial classifications); infra notes 61–66 and accompanying text (discussing Korematsu’s marginal re-
levance as an equal protection case). 
30  See FERREN, supra note 12, at 236–59 (discussing details of the Justices’ motivations and judicial 
philosophies in Korematsu that seldom appear in standard accounts); BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF 
THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION 372 (2009) (“[N]o work of scholarship has really attempted to come to grips with 
what motivated the justices to decide Korematsu as they did . . . .”). 
31  See infra notes 49–60. 
32  WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 188–92 (1998). 
33  Exec. Order No. 9066, 3 C.F.R. 1092, 1093 (Cum. Supp. 1943) (issued Feb. 19, 1942). 
34  Public Proclamation No. 1, 7 Fed. Reg. 2320, 2321 (Mar. 2, 1942). 
35  Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173; cf. PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE 
STORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES 38–39 (1983) (collecting ample evidence that 
Congress knew its legislation would be used to enforce racist policies of military exclusion). 
36  Public Proclamation No. 3, 7 Fed. Reg. 2543 (Mar. 24, 1942). 
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house arrest, for it required regulated persons to be home from 8:00 p.m. to 
6:00 a.m. and to be in their workplace, within five miles of home, or travel-
ing between work and home at all other times.37 
Not six months after Pearl Harbor, DeWitt began ordering persons of 
Japanese ancestry to “evacuate” military zones, though that word was a eu-
phemism as well.38  Every family of Japanese ancestry had to report to Civil 
Control Stations or Assembly Centers, and appearance at such facilities was 
typically followed by indefinite confinement at Relocation Centers in Ida-
ho, Utah, Arkansas, Wyoming, Arizona, Colorado, and remote parts of Cal-
ifornia.39  For the large population of Japanese-Americans on the Pacific 
Coast, DeWitt’s orders must have seemed more like racially targeted impri-
sonment than evacuation. 
The Supreme Court issued two decisions evaluating these governmen-
tal policies.  In 1943, Hirabayashi upheld a defendant’s conviction for vi-
olating DeWitt’s curfew, and Korematsu in 1944 upheld a defendant’s 
conviction for violating DeWitt’s reporting requirement.40  Both cases in-
volved exactly the same claims of military necessity and exactly the same 
legal authorities.41  Indeed, the government’s brief in Korematsu explicitly 
incorporated by reference much of the factual evidence that had been pre-
sented the year before in Hirabayashi.42 
The President’s core claim in both cases was that a racially homogen-
ous wartime enemy was supported by a set of aliens and citizens in the 
 
37  Id. 
38  DeWitt issued 108 such orders.  IRONS, supra note 35, at 70. 
39  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 230 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[A]n Assembly 
Center was a euphemism for a prison.  No person within such a center was permitted to leave except by 
Military Order . . . .”); id. at 243 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he only way Korematsu could avoid vi-
olation was to give himself up to the military authority.  This meant submission to custody, examination, 
and transportation out of the territory, to be followed by indeterminate confinement in detention 
camps.”).  As a technical matter, the Korematsu majority limited its holding to DeWitt’s “reporting” re-
quirement, avoiding passing judgment on the broader “relocation” program.  Id. at 221–23 (majority 
opinion). 
40  Id. at 223–24 (majority opinion); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943). 
41  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217–18 (“In the light of the principles we announced in the Hira-
bayashi case, we are unable to conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the Execu-
tive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area at the time they did.  True, 
exclusion from the area in which one’s home is located is a far greater deprivation than constant con-
ferment to the home from 8 p.m. to 6 a.m. . . .  But exclusion from a threatened area, no less than cur-
few, has a definite and close relationship to the prevention of espionage and sabotage.”); id. at 218–19; 
see also Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94–95 (accepting Executive Order No. 9066 as necessary “for the 
avowed purpose of safeguarding the military area in question, at a time of threatened air raids and inva-
sion by Japanese forces, from the danger of sabotage and espionage”). 
42  Brief for the United States at 11, Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (No. 22) (“The situation leading to the 
determination to exclude all persons of Japanese ancestry from Military Area No. 1 and the California 
portion of Military Area No. 2 was stated in detail in the Government’s brief in this Court in Hirabaya-
shi v. United States . . . .  That statement need not be repeated here.” (emphasis added)). 
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United States who could not be individually identified.43  To meet such dire 
asserted threats, the military claimed it was necessary to subject a racially 
determined mass of potential suspects to curfews, reporting, and evacua-
tion.  The Court upheld such executive decisions, which Congress had ap-
proved ex ante, by a unanimous vote in Hirabayashi and by a six-vote 
majority in Korematsu.44 
To modern observers, Hirabayashi and Korematsu seem astonishingly 
misguided.  Both involved explicit racial discrimination, and the govern-
ment had no credible argument that such discrimination was needed to se-
cure the homeland.45  Twenty-first-century doctrine and legal culture 
typically require very strong justifications to support racial classifications.46  
Because the policies in Hirabayashi and Korematsu lacked such support, 
their racial discrimination would be unconstitutional today, and some mod-
ern analysts have not looked much further into the Court’s analysis.47 
 
43  Id. at 12 (“There was a basis for concluding that some persons of Japanese ancestry, although 
American citizens, had formed an attachment to, and sympathy and enthusiasm for, Japan.  It was also 
evident that it would be impossible quickly and accurately to distinguish these persons from other citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry.” (footnote omitted)); Brief for the United States at 35, Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 
81 (No. 870) (“[T]he group as a whole contained an unknown number of persons who could not readily 
be singled out and who were a threat to the security of the nation; and in order to impose effective re-
straints upon them it was necessary not only to deal with the entire group, but to deal with it at once.”) 
44  Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 83.  In Korematsu, Justices Black, Stone, Reed, Douglas, Rutledge, and 
Frankfurter made up the majority, and Justices Roberts, Murphy, and Jackson wrote dissents.  323 U.S. 
at 215, 225, 233, 242. 
45  Craig Green, Wiley Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 99, 133–40 (2006) (explaining the egregiously racist and misguided nature of the government’s 
arguments about military necessity); Rostow, supra note 6, at 520–22; Eric L. Muller, Hirabayashi: The 
Biggest Lie of the Greatest Generation 4 (Univ. of N.C. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1233682, 
2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1233682 (“Archival records now make clear that . . . talk of 
a threatened Japanese invasion was a massive distortion of the actual military situation . . . .  There 
was . . . no danger of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. . . .  [T]op military officials shared [this in-
formation] with members of Congress in early February of 1942 . . . .”).  See generally ROGER K. 
NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 317–19 (1997) (noting Justice Black’s defense of Korematsu in 
1967: “I would do precisely the same thing today, in any part of the country . . . .  [The Japanese] all 
look alike to a person not a Jap . . . .  I saw nothing wrong in moving them away from the danger area.”). 
46  See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007); 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 32, at 
207 (“Under today’s constitutional law, . . . any sort of ‘racial’ classification by government is viewed as 
‘suspect,’ and an extraordinarily strong reason is required to justify it.  But the law was by no means so 
clear in 1943 and 1944 . . . .”). 
47  Cf. COMM’N ON WARTIME RELOCATION & INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS, PERSONAL JUSTICE 
DENIED 239 (1997) (“Korematsu has not been overruled—we have not been so unfortunate that a repeti-
tion of the facts has occurred to give the Court that opportunity—but each part of the decision, questions 
of both factual review and legal principles, has been discredited or abandoned.”); Dean Masaru Hashi-
moto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. 
AM. L.J. 72, 88 (1996) (explaining that later equal protection cases quoted language from Korematsu in 
support of strict scrutiny analysis). 
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This race-based interpretation of Korematsu, which was nearly univer-
sal before 9/11, may seem familiar and almost comfortable because it links 
World War II internment with other extreme examples of premodern racism 
such as lynchings, peonage, and explicitly racist exclusions of voters and 
jurors—all of which are now shelved in the dusty past.48  Yet this racial fo-
cus risks an anachronism that misrepresents the past and disserves the 
present.  As we shall see, this is a field where reinterpreting Korematsu as 
the Court decided it in 1944 may also improve constitutional analysis today. 
Simple vote counting shows that the Korematsu Court itself did not 
view the case as involving straightforward racial discrimination.  Several 
Justices who were sensitive to racial issues in other cases—including Doug-
las, Rutledge, Black, and Stone—were majority votes for the government in 
Korematsu.49  And two Justices with far less progressive records on race—
Roberts and Jackson—were among Korematsu’s dissenters.50  This indi-
cates that these Justices did not find the cases’ racial elements to be deci-
sive; other doctrinal factors were driving their determinations. 
Modern scholars have largely ignored the difficult and decisive issue 
confronting the Court: what to do with the Court’s year-old decision in Hi-
rabayashi, which had relied on identical claims of military need to uphold 
an identically racist curfew.51  In Hirabayashi, all nine Justices endorsed the 
 
48  See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT 
OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II 197–98 (2008) (peonage); GOLUBOFF, 
supra note 10, at 56–71 (peonage); KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 8–9, 14–16 (disfranchisement and ex-
clusion from juries); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, THE DEATH OF RECONSTRUCTION: RACE, LABOR, 
AND POLITICS IN THE POST-CIVIL WAR NORTH, 1865–1901, at 218–19 (2001) (lynchings); C. VANN 
WOODWARD, ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOUTH: 1877–1913, at 55–57 (1971) (disenfranchisement); C. VANN 
WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 7–12 (2002) (Jim Crow segregation). 
49  See Alexander v. Holmes Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 1218, 1222 (1969) (Black, J., opinion in 
chambers) (criticizing delayed desegregation because “there is no reason why such a wholesale depriva-
tion of constitutional rights should be tolerated another minute”); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United 
States, 379 U.S. 241, 280 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (insisting on a broad constitutional “right to 
be free of [racially] discriminatory treatment”); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 
152–53 n.4 (1938) (Stone, C.J.) (suggesting that racial discrimination warrants “searching judicial in-
quiry”); FERREN, supra note 12, at 387 (quoting Judge Louis Pollak’s prediction, as Justice Rutledge’s 
former clerk, that Rutledge “would have moved” against racial discrimination in public schools “if he’d 
had the chance”). 
50  See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 139 (1945) (Roberts, J., dissenting) (characterizing the 
beating to death of a black man by police officers as a “relatively minor offense”); Grovey v. Townsend, 
295 U.S. 45, 54–55 (1935) (Roberts, J.) (upholding an all white democratic primary); William O. Doug-
las, Conference Notes on Brown at 4 (1952) (on file with the Library of Congress, William O. Douglas 
Papers, Box 1150, Folder “Original Conference Notes”) (noting Justice Jackson’s desire to uphold se-
gregated schools); Tom C. Clark, Conference Notes on Brown v. Bd. of Educ. at 3–4 (1952) (on file with 
the Tarlton Law Library, Univ. of Tex., Austin, Tom C. Clark Papers, Box A27, Folder 4) (noting that 
Justice Jackson argued that nothing in the text of the Constitution or in the Court’s prior decisions de-
monstrates that segregated schools are unconstitutional). 
51  Hirabayashi was vital during Korematsu’s conference vote.  FERREN, supra note 12, at 249; 
IRONS, supra note 35, at 338; Frank Murphy, Conference Notes (1944) (on file with Bentley Historical 
Library, Univ. of Mich., Frank Murphy Papers, Roll 129, No. 20).  Initially Justices Stone, Black, Frank-
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sweeping principle that governmental officials could adopt public safety 
measures “in the crisis of war and of threatened invasion, . . . based upon 
the recognition of facts and circumstances which indicate that a group of 
one national extraction may menace that safety more than others” notwith-
standing the fact that “in other and in most circumstances racial distinctions 
are irrelevant.”52  This simple holding established that presidential claims of 
wartime necessity could displace ordinary norms against racism.  And the 
Court in World War II might have fairly doubted whether, as distant East 
Coast judges, they could ever know what kind of military response would 
be necessary to counter Japanese threats or how much racism might be ap-
propriate as opposed to excessive. 
No Justice in Korematsu suggested that Hirabayashi was incorrect or 
should be overruled.  On the contrary, Korematsu’s majority fiercely as-
serted that the two cases could not be distinguished, and the dissenters of-
fered no serious counterargument.53  For the entire Court in Hirabayashi 
and the majority in Korematsu, these decisions were primarily about wheth-
er Presidents could keep America safe by any means necessary; they were 
not about how racial groups should generally be treated.54 
The Court’s focus on military need explains not only the majority opi-
nion in Korematsu but also the dissents.  For the three dissenting Justices, 
something had dramatically changed during the year that separated Hira-
bayashi and Korematsu.  Whatever drove that change, however, it certainly 
was not a radical shift in the Justices’ constitutional philosophies of race.  
Instead, the passing months had mainly clarified the true scope of danger to 
American domestic security and the government’s ebbing credibility in ar-
 
furter, and Reed voted to affirm Korematsu’s conviction; Justices Roberts, Murphy, Jackson, and Doug-
las voted to reverse.  Because Justices speak at conference in order of seniority—and eight members of 
the Court were evenly divided—the final decision fell to Justice Wiley Rutledge.  FERREN, supra note 
12, at 249.  Justice Stone gently prodded, “If you can do it for a curfew, you can do it for exclusion,” 
and Justice Rutledge told his colleagues: “I had to swallow Hirabayashi.  I didn’t like it.  At that time, I 
knew if I went along with that [curfew] order then I had to go along with detention for a reasonably ne-
cessary time.  Nothing but necessity would justify it . . . .”  THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE 
(1940–1985), at 690 (Del Dickson ed., 2001).  Rutledge voted to affirm, and Douglas later switched to 
join the majority.  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215, 225, 233, 242 (1944). 
52  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 101 (1943) (emphasis added). 
53  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 214, 217–18. 
54  Id. at 223 (“Our task would be simple, our duty clear, were this a case involving the imprison-
ment of a loyal citizen in a concentration camp because of racial prejudice. . . .  To cast this case into 
outlines of racial prejudice, without reference to the real military dangers which were presented, merely 
confuses the issue.  Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to him or 
his race.  He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese Empire . . . .” (first emphasis add-
ed)); Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (“Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are 
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equali-
ty. . . .  We may assume that these considerations would be controlling here were it not for the fact that 
the danger of espionage and sabotage, in time of war and of threatened invasion, calls upon the military 
authorities to scrutinize every relevant fact bearing on the loyalty of populations in the danger areas.”); 
see FERREN, supra note 12, at 249. 
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guing about such subjects.  Threats of invasion and sabotage had dissipated 
in 1944, and a military report released in January had embarrassed DeWitt’s 
justification for his actions.55  That report was so disgraceful that Justice 
Murphy’s dissent quoted it extensively and a journalist used it to wage an 
extensive attack on the government’s factual claims.56 
By 1944, the government itself had admitted that some prisoners in re-
location centers were entirely loyal thereby revealing that its decision to de-
tain Japanese-Americans was unjustifiably broad.57  The internment period 
was also distressingly long, having lasted for two years with no sign of 
stopping.  From the perspective of military necessity, the government’s 
drastic and unending policy of mass internment was much harder to defend 
in 1944 than its seemingly temporary house arrest was in 1943. 
The uniquely decisive question in Hirabayashi and Korematsu was 
how much the Court should defer to the President’s assertions of military 
necessity.  Such military judgments had been explicitly supported by Con-
gress and were hard to falsify, but they were also increasingly hard to be-
lieve.  The government’s arguments in both cases relied on President 
Roosevelt’s perceived credibility and competence, which may have led 
some Justices to uphold constitutionally troublesome policies in deference 
to urgent claims about national security.58 
Notwithstanding Hirabayashi’s force under stare decisis as a unanim-
ous year-old decision, and despite the fact that there was no change in the 
Court’s membership, Korematsu’s conference vote was still only five to 
 
55  J.L. DEWITT, FINAL REPORT: JAPANESE EVACUATION FROM THE WEST COAST 1942 (1943); see 
also IRONS, supra note 35, at 278–84 (discussing governmental and public reactions to the report). 
56  Korematsu, 323 U.S at 235–40 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see DEWITT, supra note 55, at 34 (“The 
Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United 
States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become ‘Americanized’, the racial strains are 
undiluted.”); JOHN W. DOWER, WAR WITHOUT MERCY: RACE AND POWER IN THE PACIFIC WAR 81 
(1993) (“‘A Jap’s a Jap,’ [DeWitt] reiterated in public testimony in April 1943.  ‘You can’t change him 
by giving him a piece of paper.’  Indeed in General DeWitt’s view, the menace posed by the Japanese 
could only be eliminated by destroying the Japanese as a race.”). 
57  See Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944); Gudridge, supra note 7, at 1947.  For a surprising 
discussion of Japanese-Americans who were released from relocation camps during the war, see Char-
lotte Brooks, In the Twilight Zone Between Black and White: Japanese American Resettlement and 
Community in Chicago, 1942–1945, 86 J. AM. HIST. 1655 (2000). 
58  See G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 85 (2001) (“The idea of a po-
werful executive, exerting leadership on a variety of fronts, seemed more natural in a world where totali-
tarian states were both common and threatening.”); L.A. Powe, Jr., The Not-So-Brave New 
Constitutional Order, 117 HARV. L. REV. 647, 678, 681 (2003) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (2003)) (arguing that a successful leader like President Roosevelt can trans-
form the existing constitutional order).  When Korematsu was decided in 1944, President Roosevelt had 
just earned an unprecedented fourth presidential term, was en route to winning the United States’ largest 
foreign war, and had selected seven of the nine sitting Justices.  DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM 
FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1942–1945, at 782–97 (1999); STONE ET AL., 
supra note 25, at lxxxvi–lxxxvii. 
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four.59  If the two cases had both been decided in 1944, with an extra year of 
information and skepticism, one cannot guess what would have happened.60  
It is quite clear, however, that Korematsu’s majority saw the case as con-
cerning wartime necessity and not general principles of racial discrimina-
tion.  Even the Korematsu dissenters’ choice to discard Hirabayashi is more 
understandable from the perspective of war rather than race. 
2. Korematsu’s Modern Relevance.—This Article’s revisionism con-
cerning Korematsu’s original meaning also explains the decision’s contin-
ued significance.  Even as Korematsu’s salience to issues of racial equality 
has declined, the decision remains important as a war powers precedent.  If 
Korematsu is to be studied by modern commentators—as I think it should 
be—the relevance of this iconic case should shift to reflect such doctrinal 
developments. 
Conventional interpreters sometimes cite Hirabayashi and Korematsu 
as a matter of ordinarily authoritative (positive) precedent to prove either 
(i) that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are 
by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded 
upon the doctrine of equality”61 or (ii) that antiracist principles of equality 
constrain the federal government and not just the states.62  Regardless of 
these arguments’ historical anachronism,63 Brown and its progeny have now 
superseded the doctrinal importance of Hirabayashi and Korematsu on such 
topics.64  There were decisions even before 1943 holding that equal protec-
tion prohibits racist denials of civil rights.65  But Brown and its successors 
made these early precedents doctrinally superfluous.  Likewise, the question 
of whether equal protection should be “reverse incorporated” against the 
federal government was once highly provocative, but that issue was not ad-
 
59  See FERREN, supra note 12, at 249; IRONS, supra note 35, at 338; Murphy, supra note 51. 
60  Cf. REHNQUIST, supra note 32, at 222 (questioning whether the Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 
327 U.S. 304 (1946), might have upheld Hawaii’s martial law if that case had been decided in 1943 ra-
ther than 1946); infra Part II.B.5 (discussing the significance of delayed adjudication in modern GWOT 
cases). 
61  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943); accord Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 682 (1973) (citing Hirabayashi as evidence that classifications based on national origin are inhe-
rently suspect); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (citing Korematsu in holding that ra-
cial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny). 
62  See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215–16 (1995). 
63  See supra Part I.A.1 (challenging Korematsu’s doctrinal history as a case primarily about racial 
classifications). 
64  See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 215–18; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9–12 (1967); McLaugh-
lin, 379 U.S. at 191–92; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
65  E.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373–74 (1886); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303, 305–08 (1880). 
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dressed in Korematsu; instead, it was resolved a full decade later in Bolling 
v. Sharpe, a companion to Brown.66 
Most often, Korematsu is studied as a discredited (negative) precedent 
that exemplifies how doctrine can be abused in the service of racial preju-
dice.67  Yet even as an illustration of how racial issues should not be treated 
under the Constitution, Korematsu merits only secondary prominence.  The 
Court’s opinions in Dred Scott v. Sandford, the Civil Rights Cases, and 
Plessy v. Ferguson all incorporate governmental racism more directly than 
Korematsu,68 and the most robust evidence of racial oppression lies predo-
minantly outside federal courts in lynching, de facto segregation, voter in-
timidation, employment abuse, and suchlike.69  Thus, although the 
internment cases are a horrible instance of American racism, their segment 
of that narrative is incomplete and unrepresentative.  Korematsu also sheds 
little light on current debates over racial profiling, affirmative action, dispa-
rate impact, and the treatment of nonracial groups like homosexuals.70  In 
sum, if Korematsu were studied today simply for its contribution to equal 
protection jurisprudence, its doctrinal importance would be mild indeed. 
 
66  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).  “Reverse incorporation” is the constitutional doc-
trine by which equal protection—which appears only in the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to the 
states—is applied to the federal government.  For discussion of the scholarly controversy over reverse 
incorporation, see Peter J. Rubin, Taking Its Proper Place in the Constitutional Canon: Bolling v. 
Sharpe, Korematsu, and the Equal Protection Component of Fifth Amendment Due Process, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 1879 (2006).  Part I.A.1, supra, explains why I disagree with Rubin’s orthodox conclusion that Ko-
rematsu “utilizes principles of equal protection” and is a direct precursor to Bolling.  See Rubin, supra, 
at 1891–92.  For further evidence that Korematsu and Hirabayashi were not understood at the time as 
adopting reverse incorporation, consider cases between 1944 and 1954 that cited Korematsu and Hira-
bayashi yet nevertheless declined to hold that equal protection restrained federal and state governments 
equally.  E.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 418 (1948) (“It does not follow . . . 
that because the United States regulates . . . in part on the basis of race and color classifications, a state 
can adopt one or more of the same classifications . . . .”); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 28–36 (1948) 
(noting that Korematsu and Hirabayashi had been litigated “on the assumption” of reverse incorpora-
tion, without resolving that constitutional issue, and declining also to resolve it in 1948); Bob-Lo Excur-
sion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28, 37 n.16 (1947) (citing Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Endo as 
evidence that racial classifications are undesirable as a matter “of national policy” rather than as a matter 
of constitutional obligation).  The Court had no reason to be so coy in 1948 if (as many modernists as-
sume) the issue of reverse incorporation had already been decided in 1943 and 1944. 
67  See supra text accompanying notes 3, 7 (collecting examples from casebooks and commentary); 
see also Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236; id. at 244 n.2 (Stevens, J. dissenting); id. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting). 
68  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); Dred Scott 
v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
69  See supra text accompanying note 48 (collecting sources about premodern racism). 
70  See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005) (considering racial jury selection); 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311 (2003) (addressing affirmative action in law school admissions); 
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–35 (1996) (considering sexual orientation discrimination); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232–36 (1976) (discussing a test’s racially disparate impact on the hiring 
of police officers). 
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Despite Hirabayashi’s and Korematsu’s limited doctrinal relevance 
with respect to equal protection, they have persistent weight in the field of 
war powers and military necessity; indeed, United States history after 
World War II has only expanded such significance.  The dominant frame-
work for executive power today is Justice Jackson’s concurrence in 
Youngstown, which set out a three-category framework for executive power 
based on its relationship to legislative authority.71  The foundational 
Youngstown principle requires Presidents ordinarily to seek congressional 
authorization as support for their wartime activities.  When a President acts 
consistently with “express or implied authorization,” executive constitu-
tional power is “at its maximum.”72  When a President acts without congres-
sional support or opposition, “there is a zone of twilight in which he and 
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is un-
certain.”73  And when a President acts contrary to congressional instruc-
tions, “his power is at its lowest ebb.”74 
More than any other case, Korematsu exemplifies the constitutional 
problems that arise when Congress and the President act together, i.e., when 
presidential authority is “at its maximum.”75  We shall see that the Court’s 
recent GWOT case, Boumediene v. Bush, raised precisely this Korematsu 
problem of how much deference courts should give to legislatively ap-
proved claims of military necessity in evaluating presidential conduct that 
might otherwise be flatly illegal.76 
If Korematsu merits widespread study and currency in American legal 
culture, a change in emphasis seems appropriate.  The Court’s incidental 
language about “most rigid scrutiny” and “legal restrictions . . . [upon] a 
single racial group” should not distract modern readers from Korematsu’s 
original and still essential holding about military power.77  To be sure, some 
readers may doubt whether Korematsu can ever be understood apart from 
its searing racism—the pull of conventional wisdom may be too strong.  
The meaning of iconic decisions, however, is not always static.  The fore-
going study of Korematsu and Hirabayashi has shown that their meaning 
has already changed in two ways: from authoritative to discredited prece-
dents, and from cases about wartime national security to cases about racial 
discrimination.78  Reorienting Korematsu toward its original roots may thus 
be more feasible than ahistorical conventionalism would generally suppose. 
 
71  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
72  Id. at 635. 
73  Id. at 637. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 635–37. 
76  553 U.S. 723, 732–33 (2008); see infra Part II.B.4. 
77  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). 
78  See supra Part I.A.1. 
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B. Korematsu’s Companions: Identifying the Korematsu Era 
Armed with a revised view of Korematsu’s and Hirabayashi’s com-
mon doctrinal core, this section identifies three cases decided a few years 
later that also applied strong deference to presidential assertions of military 
necessity in wartime.79  Although my list is not exhaustive, I propose that 
these three decisions illustrate a distinctive judicial approach to presidential 
war powers that merits discussion as an aggregated era.80 
1. Ex Parte Quirin.—Ex parte Quirin concerned the trial by military 
commission of eight men who were accused of spying and conspiring to 
spy in violation of the laws of war and federal statutes.81  The defendants 
were seven German citizens and one American citizen who traveled to the 
United States on Nazi submarines in June 1942.82  One team landed on a 
beach on Long Island, New York; the other landed on a beach near Jack-
sonville, Florida.  Both groups carried explosive materials and uniforms 
from the German Marine Infantry—which were promptly discarded and bu-
ried under the sand.  Within a week, two defendants had voluntarily surren-
dered to the FBI; one week later, all eight had confessed and were in the 
United States’ custody. 
President Roosevelt chose not to prosecute the Quirin defendants in a 
civilian court because of the small penalties for their unrealized conspiracy, 
and he did not prosecute in a court-martial because of applicable burdens of 
proof and strict evidentiary rules.83  Instead, the President signed an order 
naming particular officials to adjudicate the defendants’ case in a military 
commission and also naming the prosecutors and defense counsel who 
would participate.84 
The defendants challenged the legality of this military commission 
process, and on July 29 and 30, the Supreme Court heard nine hours of oral 
argument in their case.85  On July 31, the Court announced a unanimous per 
curiam judgment supporting the government, with full opinions to issue at a 
later date.86  On August 3, the military commission convicted the defendants 
and sentenced them to death.  Six of the eight were executed that weekend, 
while the others who had voluntarily turned themselves in—hoping to be 
 
79  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946); Ex parte Qui-
rin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
80  For analogies to other doctrinal eras, see supra text accompanying note 10. 
81  317 U.S. at 20–23. 
82  The following factual account is based on LOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31340, 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS: THE QUIRIN PRECEDENT (2002) [hereinafter FISHER, QUIRIN]; MICHAEL DOBBS, 
SABOTEURS: THE NAZI RAID ON AMERICA (2004); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 206–07 
(2d ed., rev. 2004); David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 21 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61 (1996). 
83  FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 328–31 (1962). 
84  Military Order of July 2, 1942, 3 C.F.R. 1308 (Cum. Supp. 1943). 
85  DOBBS, supra note 82, at 240–44. 
86  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1. 
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celebrated as heroes for betraying the Nazis—received life sentences and 
were much later deported to Germany.87 
The Court issued an opinion explaining the result in Quirin twelve 
weeks after the defendants were executed.88  The Court held that: (i) Con-
gress had authorized the President to convene military commissions, (ii) the 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not apply to military commissions that pu-
nish war crimes, and (iii) extant statutory law did not bar the government 
from using stripped-down adjudicative procedures.89  The Court described 
its deferential role as follows: “[T]he detention and trial of petitioners—
ordered by the President in the declared exercise of his powers as Com-
mander in Chief of the Army in time of war and of grave public danger—
are not to be set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they 
are in conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally 
enacted.”90 
Despite obvious factual differences between Quirin and Korematsu, 
both decisions analyzed presidential conduct that Congress had approved, 
and both cases allowed the Executive to depart from otherwise basic legal 
norms.  Whereas Korematsu enforced racist detention policies based on al-
leged military necessity, Quirin upheld a military commission that was not 
tethered by ordinary due process.91  On both occasions, the Court sacrificed 
basic legalist commitments (e.g., due process and antiracism) in deference 
to presidential claims of wartime exigency. 
2. In re Yamashita.—Yamashita involved the military commission 
trial of Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita for his subordinates’ war 
crimes—including the torture, rape, killing, and mutilation of innocents—
which were committed as the United States invaded the Philippines and de-
 
87  See DOBBS, supra note 82, at 263. 
88  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1 (issued Oct. 29, 1942). 
89  Id. at 26–28, 38–47. 
90  Id. at 25 (emphasis added); accord id. at 45–46 (“We have no occasion now to define with meti-
culous care the ultimate boundaries of the jurisdiction of military tribunals to try persons according to 
the law of war.  It is enough that petitioners here, upon the conceded facts, were plainly within those 
boundaries, and were held in good faith for trial by military commission, charged with being enemies 
who, with the purpose of destroying war materials and utilities, entered, or after entry remained in, our 
territory without uniform—an offense against the law of war.”); see also Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit 
of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23, 33–37 (2002) (noting that executive officials in the GWOT have 
used Quirin to justify the use of military tribunals). 
91  FISHER, QUIRIN, supra note 82, at 8 (“The commission could . . . discard procedures from the Ar-
ticles of War . . . whenever it wanted to. . . .  ‘Of course, if the Commission please, the Commission has 
discretion to do anything it pleases; there is no dispute about that.’” (quoting the prosecuting Judge Ad-
vocate General)); Morris D. Davis, The Influence of Ex Parte Quirin and Courts-Martial on Military 
Commissions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 121, 124 (2008), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
lawreview/colloquy/2008/34/LRColl2008n34Davis.pdf (“[I]t took only seven weeks for the President to 
create and convene a military commission, for prosecutors and defense counsel to prepare their cases, to 
litigate a joint trial for eight men, for an appeal to the district court to be filed and denied, for the Su-
preme Court to hear oral arguments and render a decision, and for six men to be executed and buried.”). 
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stroyed Yamashita’s control over his men.92  One of MacArthur’s aides ex-
plained that Yamashita should be criminally punished for “negligence in al-
lowing his subordinates to commit atrocities.”93  The commission was 
composed of five military officials, none of whom was a lawyer.94  The 
United States initially alleged sixty-four war crimes committed by Yama-
shita’s soldiers, but three days before trial, the prosecution charged fifty-
nine additional atrocities.95  Defense counsel’s request for a continuance to 
address the new allegations was denied.96  The prosecution’s evidence from 
286 witnesses and 423 exhibits was almost all hearsay, and virtually none 
of it showed any direct link between Yamashita and the charged war 
crimes.97  Nevertheless, on December 7, 1945—the fraught anniversary of 
Pearl Harbor—Yamashita was convicted and sentenced to death by hang-
ing.98 
Yamashita challenged the military commission’s lax evidentiary rules 
on several grounds, each of which the Supreme Court summarily rejected.  
First, Yamashita noted that the statutory Articles of War forbade deposition 
evidence in capital cases before “any military court or commission” and al-
so banned hearsay evidence before “military commissions and other mili-
tary tribunals.”99  But the Court found that enemy combatants were not 
listed as “persons” governed by such rules.100  Second, the Geneva Conven-
tions required prisoners of war to be tried “only by the same courts and ac-
cording to the same procedure” as would apply to the detaining 
government’s own troops.101  Yet the Court applied this requirement only to 
crimes by prisoners of war while in detention and not to crimes committed 
before such prisoners were captured.102  Third, Yamashita claimed that his 
trial violated constitutional due process, but the Court granted the Executive 
irrefutable deference: “[T]he commission’s rulings on evidence and on the 
mode of conducting these proceedings . . . are not reviewable by the courts, 
 
92  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1946); id. at 29 (Murphy, J., dissenting).  The following account 
of events is based on FERREN, supra note 12, at 301–21, and John M. Ferren, General Yamashita and 
Justice Rutledge, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 54, 58–59 (2003). 
93  FERREN, supra note 12, at 4 (quoting Major General R.J. Marshall). 
94  Ferren, supra note 92, at 57. 
95  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 57 (Rutledge, J., dissenting); FERREN, supra note 12, at 308. 
96  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 58. 
97  Id. at 50–51; FERREN, supra note 12, at 307–08 (“The commission thus condemned the general to 
death . . . with findings based substantially on untrustworthy, unverified, unauthenticated evidence not 
questioned . . . by cross-examination . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 6 (“The trial . . . 
lasted for nineteen days of testimony by 286 witnesses—including not only eyewitness testimony but 
also hearsay upon hearsay, and even uncross-examined affidavits—spelling out the gruesome details.  
Only two witnesses offered testimony directly connecting General Yamashita to the brutality.”). 
98  Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 5 (majority opinion). 
99  Id. at 18–19. 
100  Id. at 19. 
101  Id. at 20–21. 
102  Id. at 21–22. 
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but only by the reviewing military authorities. . . .  [I]t is unnecessary to 
consider what, in other situations, the Fifth Amendment might re-
quire . . . .”103  In essence, Yamashita raised a number of challenges to his 
capital trial’s basic procedural adequacy by military commission, but the 
Supreme Court set these concerns categorically aside. 
A dissent by Justice Rutledge listed several ways that Yamashita’s cap-
ital prosecution deviated from criminal law traditions, including the military 
commission’s ex post facto theory of “commander liability,” insufficient 
notice, imposition of strict criminal liability, inadequate time for defense, 
and evidence without confrontation.104  For Rutledge, whether such short-
comings were “taken singly . . . as departures from specific constitutional 
mandates or in totality as in violation of the Fifth Amendment[] . . . , a trial 
so vitiated cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.”105  And although Rut-
ledge acknowledged that military commissions deserve judicial deference in 
contexts of true “military necessity” or “battlefield” authority, he found 
such deference inapplicable to Yamashita’s trial, which occurred after hos-
tilities ended and without any ongoing threat.106  As Rutledge explained, 
“The difference between the Court’s view of this proceeding and my own 
comes down in the end to . . . [the Court’s judgment] that there is no law re-
strictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations 
may be prescribed . . . by the executive authority or the military . . . .”107  
Just as with Quirin, Korematsu, and Hirabayashi, the Court’s decision in 
Yamashita created a zone of judicially unsupervised executive activity and 
thereby abandoned otherwise indispensable legal values. 
3. Johnson v. Eisentrager.—Eisentrager concerned the postwar ha-
beas petitions of German citizens whom the United States had detained at 
an American military facility in Germany.108  An American military com-
mission in China had convicted these petitioners of aiding enemies of the 
United States in violation of the laws of war.109  The Eisentrager petitioners 
claimed that their trial and imprisonment violated the United States Consti-
tution and the Geneva Conventions.110  The Eisentrager Court, however, 
denied even having jurisdiction to hear the case because the petitioners 
were not American citizens and were not tried, held, or imprisoned within 
United States territory.111 
 
103  Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
104  Id. at 43–45 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
105  Id. at 45. 
106  Id. at 45–46. 
107  Id. at 81. 
108  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765–66 (1950). 
109  Id. at 766. 
110  Id. at 767. 
111  See id. at 790–91. 
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As a technical side note, the Court said that the military commissions 
under review in Eisentrager imposed “no prejudicial disparity” as com-
pared with courts-martial “that would try an offending soldier of the Ameri-
can forces of like rank.”112  In principle, however, Eisentrager barred all 
claims of overseas enemy aliens, and this raised deeper questions.  What if, 
in some future case, detainees were held without any trial, conviction, sen-
tence, or apparent release date?  What if future military commissions used 
procedures and evidentiary rules that were no better than a cheater’s coin 
flip?  What if even death sentences were someday imposed based on tor-
tured confessions, fabrication, racism, or bloodlust?  Eisentrager’s logic 
would justify denying habeas jurisdiction regardless of how egregious go-
vernmental misconduct might be so long as the victims were extraterritorial 
aliens: 
The . . . enemy alien is constitutionally subject to summary arrest, internment 
and deportation . . . .  Courts will entertain his plea for freedom from Execu-
tive custody only to ascertain the existence of a state of war and whether he is 
an alien enemy . . . .  Once these jurisdictional elements have been determined, 
courts will not inquire into any other issue as to his internment.113 
In dissent, Justice Black objected that the Eisentrager majority was “fa-
shioning wholly indefensible doctrine if it permits the executive branch, by 
deciding where its prisoners will be tried and imprisoned, to deprive all fed-
eral courts of their power to protect against a federal executive’s illegal in-
carcerations.”114  Black continued, “Perhaps, as some nations believe, there 
is merit in leaving the administration of criminal laws to executive and mili-
tary agencies completely free from judicial scrutiny.  Our Constitution has 
emphatically expressed a contrary policy.”115  Like other Korematsu-era 
cases, Eisentrager’s restriction of habeas jurisdiction opened a large field of 
unchecked executive action where presidential assertions of military neces-
sity could overcome otherwise applicable limits. 
C. The Korematsu Era’s Flaws 
The foregoing cases about executive detention and military commis-
sions have a common thread of extreme deference to asserted military ne-
cessity; in my view, this approach to presidential power and limited judicial 
 
112  Id. at 790.  But see MICHAEL T. GEARY, SWEET LAND OF SECURITY: AMERICA’S RESPONSES TO 
TERROR FROM THE REVOLUTION THROUGH TODAY’S “WAR ON TERROR” 8 (2007) (asserting that mili-
tary commissions’ reputation “for providing justice is questionable, while their reputation for delivering 
revenge is indisputable”); H. Wayne Elliott, Military Commissions: An Overview, in ENEMY 
COMBATANTS, TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 121, 124 (David K. 
Linnan ed., 2008) (explaining that it is more difficult for the government to fulfill the requirements of 
courts-martial than to fulfill the procedurally flexible rules of military commissions). 
113  Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 775. 
114  Id. at 795 (Black, J., dissenting). 
115  Id. at 797–98. 
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oversight is what defines the Korematsu era.  The next step is to explain 
why Korematsu and its contemporaries remain problematic even when the 
era is detached from issues of governmental racism.  For most readers, the 
very name Korematsu prompts negative reactions, yet some commentators 
might endorse a Korematsu-era commitment to extraordinary presidential 
power without Korematsu’s cultural taint.116  Accordingly, this section will 
sketch four historical trends that have made the Korematsu era’s approach 
to presidential action less persuasive as time has passed. 
First, subsequent history has shown that the Executive Branch’s own 
misleading and deceptive conduct infected some of these Korematsu-era 
cases.  In Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the government defended its curfew 
and internment policies by exaggerating information about domestic espio-
nage and by concealing material information from the Court.117  These tac-
tics mark a low point in the history of federal litigation, leading one expert 
on the period to call the Japanese-American cases “the biggest lie of the 
greatest generation.”118  The government’s concealment and misconduct 
caused a federal district court to grant Korematsu coram nobis in subse-
quent litigation.119 
The government was similarly dishonest in Quirin, where it factually 
misled the public in order to conceal the conspirators’ voluntary surrender 
and the corresponding weakness of American counterintelligence.120  In-
deed, the government decided to use a secret military commission partly to 
avoid embarrassing disclosures about how easily the conspirators entered 
and traveled in the United States and to hide that several conspirators did 
not seek to harm the American public.121  These cases illustrate that, effec-
 
116  See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, 
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 3–10 (2007) (arguing that the government should have wide latitude to re-
strict liberties in emergencies); JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at viii–xi (2005) (advocating broad executive authority in wartime); John 
C. Eastman, Listening to the Enemy: The President’s Power to Conduct Surveillance of Enemy Commu-
nications During Time of War, 13 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 49, 52–53, 56–57 (2006). 
117  IRONS, supra note 35, at 285 (explaining that the Department of Justice possessed “substantially 
incontrovertible evidence that the most important statements of fact advanced by General DeWitt to jus-
tify the evacuation and detention [of the Japanese] were incorrect, and furthermore that General DeWitt 
had cause to know, and in all probability did know, that they were incorrect at the time he embodied 
them in his final report . . . .” (quoting John Burling) (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
118  Muller, supra note 45, at 1. 
119  Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1419–20 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  Coram nobis is an 
extremely rare writ that eviscerates a prior court’s judgment based on factual errors “of the most funda-
mental character, that is, such as rendered the [prior] proceeding itself irregular and invalid.”  United 
States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69 (1914). 
120  DOBBS, supra note 82, at 189–206. 
121  Of the eight saboteurs, only two showed any mentionable interest in pursuing their “mission.”  
See id. at 124.  Two men had turned themselves in, two discussed “ways out” of their predicament, and 
one appeared content to live carefree and harmless in the United States.  Id. at 140–44, 154–55, 177–86. 
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tively unchecked, past administrations have bent or broken the factual 
record in cases that concerned national security threats. 
To speak in more general terms, the President’s credibility will always 
be crucial in cases like Korematsu.  Courts will never have perfect informa-
tion about security threats or what is needed to stop them; typically, judges 
can only consider the facts that a President provides and either doubt or be-
lieve their veracity.  In the words of Jackson’s Korematsu dissent: 
The limitation under which courts always will labor in examining the necessi-
ty for a military order are illustrated by this case.  How does the Court know 
that these orders have a reasonable basis in necessity?  No evidence whatever 
on that subject has been taken by this or any other court. . . .  So the Court, 
having no real evidence before it, has no choice but to accept General De-
Witt’s own unsworn, self-serving statement, untested by any cross-
examination, that what he did was reasonable.  And thus it will always be when 
courts try to look into the reasonableness of a military order.122 
The historical record from World War II is replete with examples of the Ex-
ecutive Branch abusing this trust.  The fact that President Roosevelt misled 
the public and that his Solicitor General misled the Court about military 
threats and countermeasures during World War II has understandably dam-
aged the credibility of later Presidents making similar arguments in modern 
contexts.123 
 
122  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (emphasis add-
ed). 
123  E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 337 F.3d 335, 375 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (“[O]ne need not refer back to the time of the Framers to understand that courts must 
be vigilant in guarding Constitutional freedoms, perhaps never more so than in time of war.  We must 
not forget the lesson of Korematsu . . . .  In its deference to an Executive report that, like the Mobbs dec-
laration, was filed by a member of the Executive associated with the military and which purported to 
explain the Executive’s actions, the Court upheld the Executive’s conviction of Korematsu for simply 
remaining in his home . . . .  Of course, history has long since rejected the Korematsu holding.  Indeed, 
Congress itself has specifically repudiated Korematsu, recognizing that ‘a grave injustice was done to’ 
those ‘of Japanese ancestry by th[e] actions . . . carried out without adequate security reasons . . . .’” (al-
teration in original) (quoting 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989a(a) (West 1990))); GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 
184–85 (noting with disapproval that certain academics have characterized the Bush Administration’s 
“mendacious reaction to 9/11” as “akin to past presidential overreactions to perceived threats,” including 
“the Japanese internment”). 
Such credibility issues surfaced dramatically in Hamdi’s oral argument before the Supreme Court.  
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 54–55, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) 
(“MR. DUNHAM: May it please the Court. [Principal Deputy Solicitor General Paul Clement] is a wor-
thy advocate and he can stand up here and make the unreasonable sound reasonable.  But when you take 
his argument at core, it is, ‘Trust us.’  And who is saying trust us?  The executive branch. . . .  [T]he 
Government[’s] saying trust us is no excuse for taking away and driving a truck through the right of ha-
beas corpus and the Fifth Amendment that no man shall be deprived of liberty except upon due process 
of law.”), quoted and discussed in Neil S. Siegel, Review Essay, A Prescription for Perilous Times, 
93 GEO. L.J. 1645, 1679 n.198 (2005) (reviewing STONE, supra note 6); STONE, supra note 6, at 555 
(“As the former ambassador James Goodby has written, in the Bush administration fear has too often 
‘become the underlying theme of domestic and foreign policy.’  The ‘bottom line has been . . . “You are 
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Second, although some mid-century observers viewed Korematsu-era 
cases as pragmatic and modest, subsequent history has made such cases’ 
security concerns seem nearsighted when weighed against countervailing 
harms to other values.124  For example, Americans in the late twentieth cen-
tury could hardly envision threats that might require prolonged executive 
detention or military commissions.125  Even ten years after 9/11, students of 
Korematsu often need reminders about how dire the Japanese threat seemed 
in 1942, including the fact that Japanese bombs fell on North American soil 
and popular fears of a West Coast invasion.126  The United States’ long pe-
riod of homeland safety has (to the dismay of national security profession-
als) limited Americans’ ability to imagine the threats of wholesale invasion 
and sabotage that the Court discussed in Korematsu.127 
By contrast, twentieth-century legalism has repeatedly emphasized 
values like procedural regularity and fairness, and federal courts have rou-
tinely enforced such principles.128  In countless cases, courts and commen-
tary have assumed that rule-of-law norms must not bend to political 
pressure.129  Such practiced inflexibility, combined with the generational in-
 
scared—trust us.”’” (quoting James Goodby & Kenneth Weisbrode, Bush’s Corrosive Campaign of 
Fear, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2003))).  The modern Court’s treatment of presidential credibility problems 
is discussed infra Part II.B. 
124  Compare Clinton Rossiter, Martial Rule in World War II: The Case of the Japanese-Americans, 
in THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF 40, 54 (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1976) (“The gov-
ernment of the United States, in a case of military necessity proclaimed by the President, and a fortiori 
when Congress has registered agreement, can be just as much a dictatorship, after its own fashion, as 
any other government on earth.  The Supreme Court of the United States will not, and cannot be ex-
pected to, get in the way of this power.”), with sources cited supra notes 6–7. 
125  See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Differ-
ence Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 261, 285–88 (2002). 
126  See, e.g., REHNQUIST, supra note 32, at 188; Clark G. Reynolds, Submarine Attacks on the Pa-
cific Coast, 1942, 33 PAC. HIST. REV. 183, 191 (1964). 
127  FEITH, supra note 1, at 69 (“Because of our historical good fortune, Americans have long en-
joyed a high degree of public safety.”); see GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 187 (noting democracies’ dif-
ficulty in “fighting a long war with few obvious public signs of the threat” because public vigilance 
declines rapidly). 
128  E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring that warnings be given con-
cerning criminal defendants’ rights to counsel and against self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335, 342–43 (1963) (requiring state courts to provide counsel for criminal defendants who 
cannot afford an attorney); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (excluding evidence gained by an 
unconstitutional police search). 
129  See, e.g., FEITH, supra note 1, at 69 (“We have become accustomed to thinking that our civil li-
berties are not only sacred but unshakeable.  But a community’s freedom is affected by circums-
tances. . . .  Our Constitution and the judges that interpret it often seem to say that our freedoms are 
absolute, but when danger becomes oppressive, people will recall the quip that the Constitution is not a 
suicide pact.”); Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 741, 746–47 
(1982) (arguing that courts’ basic interpretive authority derives from their commitment to uphold and 
advance the rule of law); Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the War-
ren Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364–65 (2004); cf. 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (1989) (explaining 
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frequency of serious security threats, has tended to reaffirm modernist 
judgments that the Court’s Korematsu-era priorities were skewed. 
Third, the end of World War II coincided with a worldwide legal 
movement to limit war and executive power.  In the international sphere, 
this process found expression in the United Nations Charter’s prohibition 
on the use of international military force, the development of humanitarian 
law designed to limit armed conflict’s destructiveness, military alliances 
designed to deter aggression, and the United Nations Security Council, 
which holds “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security.”130  Such formal instruments and institutions served as 
confluent rallying points for political and nongovernmental power, and they 
are now a standard element of many countries’ military decisions, including 
those of the United States.131 
In the domestic sphere, legal restraints on executive power swelled af-
ter Watergate and Vietnam.132  Perceived executive abuse in the 1970s 
spurred legal efforts to channel and limit political discretion, drawing polit-
ical and cultural attacks on the President from Congress, social movements, 
and university campuses.133  Such traditions made it easier to credit the 
 
how rule-of-law norms embolden judges to “stand up to what is generally supreme in a democracy: the 
popular will”). 
130  U.N. Charter art. 24, para. 1; see GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 53–64. 
131  See, e.g., Treaties Memo, supra note 8, at 38. 
132  See Norman J. Ornstein, Doing Congress’s Dirty Work, 86 GEO. L.J. 2179, 2182–83 (1998) 
(“Vietnam and Watergate precipitated waves of political reform from 1968 through 1978, starting with 
party presidential nomination processes and moving to congressional power structures and decisionmak-
ing processes, ethics, and campaign finance laws. . . .  The powers of the president were checked in 
areas ranging from war powers to impoundment.” (footnotes omitted)).  The predicate for such restraints 
appeared as early as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
133  See War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2006); SAVAGE, supra note 15, at 18–19; 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 177–207 (Mariner Books 2004) (1973); Ze-
lizer, supra note 4, at 19 (explaining how President Nixon’s efforts to suppress the Pentagon Papers’ 
publication in 1971, efforts to prevent release of White House tapes in 1973, and covert programs to in-
timidate protesters spurred legislative restrictions on presidential power); id. at 21 (quoting CIA director 
William Colby, who argued that newly elected “Watergate Babies” in Congress were “exultant in the 
muscle that they had used to bring a President down, willing and able to challenge the Executive as well 
as its own Congressional hierarchy, intense over morality in government, [and] extremely sensitive to 
press and public pressures” (alteration in original) (quoting KATHRYN S. OLMSTED, CHALLENGING THE 
SECRET GOVERNMENT: THE POST-WATERGATE INVESTIGATIONS OF THE CIA AND FBI 48 (1996)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)); GARY GERSTLE, AMERICAN CRUCIBLE: RACE AND NATION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 312 (2001) (“By 1968 and 1969 partisans of [the] antiwar movement were chal-
lenging not only the rationale for the war but the moral integrity of the American state and the American 
nation.”); id. at 317–18 (“In the process of turning against America, antiwar protesters transformed 
many universities . . . .  They demanded that universities sever ties . . . to the Cold War and other im-
perial projects. . . .  The implications of this university transformation were far-reaching, for it occurred 
in institutions of enormous intellectual and strategic importance.”); cf. DANIEL T. RODGERS, AGE OF 
FRACTURE 4–5 (2011) (“The 1960s were a moment of break, but the regrouping around a different set of 
premises and themes . . . was the work of the era that followed. . . .  In political and institutional fact and 
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American trope that no one, not even the President, is above the law and not 
even in times of crisis.134  Justice Jackson’s iconic Youngstown opinion fur-
ther suggests that the status of presidential wartime activity varies based on 
its relationship to congressional will as applied and interpreted by courts.135  
All of these heightened constraints on executive power and military activity 
have combined to make Korematsu-era attitudes regarding the scope of 
presidential authority seem out of step with the modern march of legal-
ism.136 
Finally, alongside these substantive limits on presidential and military 
power, the institutional role of federal courts expanded.  The federal judi-
ciary emerged after World War II as an ardent protector of individual rights 
and an active overseer of governmental entities.137  From Brown to Mapp v. 
Ohio to New York Times v. Sullivan to Griswold v. Connecticut, an assort-
ment of landmark decisions augmented courts’ importance.138  Given the ju-
diciary’s prominence in overseeing school districts, speech in parks, police 
work, contraception, electoral districts, and the death penalty,139 modern 
analysts confront wartime executive abuse with the almost reflexive ques-
tion: “Where were the courts?”140 
 
in social imagination, the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s had been an era of consolidation.  In the last quarter 
of the century, the dominant tendency of the age was toward disaggregation.”). 
134  Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (“The government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to 
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”). 
135  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring). 
136  See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 142–43 (2001) (“[I]n the decade after the war, . . . [o]nly 
judges who were not beholden to the majority, it seemed, could protect discrete, insular, and powerless 
minorities and their rights. . . .  Once nearly all Americans came to define social justice in terms of pro-
tection of minorities from majoritarian power, however, some consensus about the judiciary’s role be-
came inevitable.”). 
137  GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 65. 
138  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 
(1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
139  E.g., Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129–30 (2009) (allowing religious sta-
tutes in a public park); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–
11 (2007) (invalidating race-based school assignment and transfer policies); Roper v. Simmons, 
543 U.S. 551, 555–56 (2005) (invalidating the juvenile death penalty); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 444–45 (1966) (requiring that criminal defendants be “read” their rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (invalidating a state ban on birth control); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 
364 U.S. 339 (1960) (reviewing electoral district boundaries). 
140  An ample literature discusses judicial role in cases affecting international affairs.  E.g., THOMAS 
M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOES THE RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS? 90–97 (1992); MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 313–14 (1990); LOUIS 
HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69–91 (1990); HAROLD HONGJU 
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 
146–48 (1990). 
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None of the foregoing analysis of the Korematsu era’s flaws is as sim-
ple as my summary would indicate, nor does it apply equally to every Ko-
rematsu-era case.  In the aggregate, however, post-war histories of 
executive abuse, cultural risk assessment, substantive legalism, and judicial 
enforcement help explain why Korematsu-era decisions have lost favor with 
scholars, the judiciary, and the public during the past six decades.  By the 
end of the twentieth century, conventional reactions to the Court’s Kore-
matsu-era decisions ranged from ignorance and desuetude (Yamashita, Qui-
rin, Eisentrager) to disapproval of a distant, ugly past (Hirabayashi, 
Korematsu).141  Few analysts considered what such cases might mean for 
modern circumstances, but that obscurity changed with the GWOT. 
II. THE WAR ON TERROR 
A. President Bush and the Korematsu Era 
The twenty-first century brought new attention to Korematsu-era case 
law and spurred new debate over its lasting force.  The Bush Administra-
tion’s major legal decision after 9/11 was to characterize the United States 
as a nation struck by acts of war rather than by international organized 
crime.142  Confronting a populace desensitized by “wars” on drugs, poverty, 
crime, and cancer, President Bush quickly compared the 9/11 attacks to 
Pearl Harbor and equated the new terrorist threat with that older “great 
cause” of World War II.143  In speeches, policy directives, memos, and ulti-
mately legal briefs, the Bush Administration defended national security tac-
tics that no President had used for decades, and executive advisers cited 
World War II’s history as the principal support for their positions.144  This 
 
141  See, e.g., Muller, supra note 7, at 1334; supra notes 3, 7 and accompanying text (discussing ca-
sebook and law review data). 
142  E.g., FEITH, supra note 1, at 18 (“President Bush’s decision to characterize 9/11 as a ‘war’ . . . 
was unusual and important.  It made us reconsider all our other national security problems in light of this 
new apprehension of the terrorist threat.”); id. at 14 (“Tell the lawyers that we’re at war, President Bush 
instructed, and we’re going to get the terrorists’ money.”); id. at 58 (“By mid-September, President Bush 
had made his beliefs clear: As an act of war, 9/11 required a response far beyond the issuance of arrest 
warrants.”). 
143  See supra text accompanying note 2 (collecting sources that compare the 9/11 attacks and Pearl 
Harbor).  For descriptions of other politically declared “wars,” see Carl M. Brauer, Kennedy, Johnson, 
and the War on Poverty, 69 J. AM. HIST. 98 (1982); David M. Cutler, Are We Finally Winning the War 
on Cancer?, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 2008, at 3; John J. DiIulio, Jr., A Limited War on Crime That We Can 
Win, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1992, at 6; James Vorenberg, The War on Crime: The First Five Years, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May 1972, at 63; and Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Ex-
ecutive Governance: Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. POL. 995 (2003). 
144  See sources cited supra notes 2, 8; see also Brief for the Respondents at 17, 44–45, 65, 68, 
Boumediene v. Bush, 555 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-1195) (citing Eisentrager, Quirin, and Yamashita to 
defend military tribunal convictions); Brief for Respondents at 9, 11, 13–14, 19, 21, 24, 27, 31–34, 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (No. 05-184) (citing Eisentrager, Yamashita, and Quirin to 
support trials by military commission); Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 4, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 
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phenomenon, and its connection to the Korematsu era, is most manifest 
with respect to executive detention and noncitizens’ prosecutions in military 
commissions. 
Consistent with the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), 
American forces in October 2001 began fighting against the Taliban, al 
Qaeda, and other forces in Afghanistan.145  Military and intelligence opera-
tions captured numerous prisoners who could not be imprisoned locally due 
to security risks.146  In November, President Bush authorized the Secretary 
of Defense to detain certain categories of aliens and prosecute a subset of 
them in military commissions for violating the laws of war.147  In December, 
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld announced plans to hold prisoners at Guantá-
namo Bay, and the first detainees arrived fifteen days later.148  In March 
2002, Rumsfeld outlined procedures for military commission trials.149 
Memos from the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and other executive 
lawyers indicate that all of these choices by the Bush Administration relied 
heavily on Korematsu-era precedents.150  For example, a key authority sup-
porting detention at Guantánamo Bay was Eisentrager, which was believed 
to eliminate federal habeas review because Guantánamo Bay—like Ameri-
can prisons in post-World War II Germany—held alien prisoners outside 
the territory of the United States.151  Executive lawyers claimed that such 
detention was exempt from judicial oversight, and this argument had poten-
tially foreseeable consequences for later interrogations and detention in Abu 
 
542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing that the Second Circuit’s writ of habeas corpus was “fun-
damentally at odds” with Quirin); Brief for the Respondents at 13–14, 17–19, 25–26, 37, 38, 49, Hamdi, 
542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696) (citing Eisentrager, Quirin, and Yamashita to support executive detention); 
Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 3, 6–16, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03-334) 
(citing Quirin and Eisentrager as authority for executive detention); Brief for the Respondents at 4, 28–
30, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (No. 03-334) (citing Quirin, Yamashita, and Eisentrager to restrict the Court’s 
habeas authority); Brief for the Petitioner at 14–15, 30–36, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) 
(No. 03-1027) (citing Quirin and Eisentrager to justify the detention of enemy combatants); Reply Brief 
for the Petitioner at 9–10, 12–14, 16, Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (No. 03-1027) (citing Quirin and Eisentrag-
er to support the executive detention of enemy saboteurs). 
145  Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Combat 
Action in Afghanistan Against Al Qaida Terrorists and Their Taliban Supporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1211, 
1211–12 (Oct. 9, 2001). 
146  See, e.g., GREENBERG, supra note 21, at 5–6. 
147  Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-citizens 
in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918, reprinted in 10 U.S.C. § 801 (2006). 
148  See GREENBERG, supra note 21, at 20, 68–80; Katharine Q. Seelye, U.S. to Hold Taliban Detai-
nees in ‘The Least Worst Place,’ N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2001, at B6. 
149  Procedures for Trials by Military Commissions of Certain Non-United States Citizens in the War 
Against Terrorism, 68 Fed. Reg. 39,374 (July 1, 2003) (codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 9.1–9.12 (2010)) (stat-
ing the effective date of the regulation as March 21, 2002). 
150  See supra note 8 (collecting sources). 
151  See Habeas Memo, supra note 8, at 29 (“The basis for denying jurisdiction to entertain a habeas 
petition filed by an alien held at [Guantánamo] rests on Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).”). 
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Ghraib and elsewhere.152  Presidential advisers argued that the government’s 
actions were substantively proper, yet the first line of defense with respect 
to extraterritorial aliens was that federal courts should not consider their 
claims at all.153 
Executive lawyers crafted policies about military commissions under 
the aegis of Quirin and Yamashita, which had held that courts should be 
permissive in evaluating such tribunals’ composition and procedures.154  
Modern military commissions offered defendants greater procedural protec-
tions than those offered in the tribunals convened in the Korematsu era.155  
Thus, the Bush Administration argued that federal courts should not meddle 
with assertedly exclusive presidential decisionmaking when it determined 
that the procedures offered in modern military commissions were too strin-
gent.156  Administration lawyers understandably declined to cite Hirabaya-
shi and Korematsu directly, yet they invoked other Korematsu-era cases as 
foundational support for presidential war powers, thereby detaching ideas 
about broad executive authority and judicial deference from explicit racial 
classifications.157 
B. The Court’s Newfound Skepticism 
It was perhaps foreseeable that the Bush Administration’s commitment 
to expansive presidential power would inspire reliance on Korematsu-era 
precedents.158  The Court’s response, however, was less predictable.  Seven 
Justices were appointed by Republican Presidents, five had directly sup-
ported President Bush’s election in litigation against Al Gore, and the Su-
preme Court’s own building had seemed vulnerable to terrorist attack.159  
Given President Bush’s claim to unique information and judgment regard-
ing national security, supported by progovernment precedents from the 
 
152  Id. at 33–34 (“[W]e believe that the rationale for holding that there is no jurisdiction to entertain 
a habeas petition from an alien held at [Guantánamo] is very strong and is the correct result under Eisen-
trager.”); see GREENBERG, supra note 21, at 219 (discussing commonalities between Guantánamo and 
the subsequent lack of professionalism and unified command at Abu Ghraib). 
153  See Habeas Memo, supra note 8, at 29–30. 
154  See Military Commissions Memo, supra note 8, at 12–13. 
155  See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 125, at 282–84. 
156  See Military Commissions Memo, supra note 8, at 3–5. 
157  See supra note 8 (collecting citations to Korematsu-era cases in executive memos). 
158  See George W. Bush, GOP Nomination Acceptance Address (Aug. 3, 2000), available at 
http://www.2000gop.com/convention/speech/speechbush.html (“We have seen a steady erosion of 
American power and an unsteady exercise of American influence. . . .  [The Clinton] administration had 
its moment.  They had their chance.  They have not led.  We will.”); see also SAVAGE, supra note 15, at 
9 (“[Vice President Dick] Cheney made no secret of his agenda of expanding—or ‘restoring’—
presidential power.  He repeatedly declared that one of his goals in office was to roll back what he 
termed ‘unwise’ limits on the presidency that were imposed after the Vietnam War and the Watergate 
scandal.”). 
159  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000); STONE ET AL., supra note 25, at lxxxviii–lxxxix; Linda 
Greenhouse, The Day Anthrax Came to the Supreme Court, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 867, 867–68 (2002). 
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1940s and 1950s, it was quite extraordinary that the Court delivered an un-
matched string of presidential losses in the GWOT war powers cases. 
Although recent scholarship has produced important analysis of these 
twenty-first-century decisions,160 their full meaning in connection with the 
Korematsu era has not been explored.  In comparing old cases with new 
ones, this section suggests that modern GWOT cases, despite their superfi-
cial technicalities, pose a much deeper challenge to the continuing endur-
ance of Korematsu-era principles regarding executive power than is 
commonly thought.  The Court’s analyses and results display a significant 
departure from the Korematsu era’s basic assumptions, which could support 
greater judicial skepticism in future national security litigation. 
1. Rasul and Eisentrager.—The Supreme Court did not pass judg-
ment on the Bush Administration’s detention policies until June 28, 2004.  
A pair of cases that day, Rasul v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, began the 
most remarkable losing record that any American President has suffered in 
the realm of executive war powers.161 
Rasul concerned habeas petitions from fourteen Guantánamo detainees 
who claimed that their uncharged detentions and the conditions of those de-
tentions violated the Constitution, treaty obligations, and customary interna-
 
160  E.g., PETER IRONS, WAR POWERS: HOW THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY HIJACKED THE 
CONSTITUTION 253–62 (2005) (describing the Court’s response to assertions of executive power); Peter 
Berkowitz, Introduction to TERRORISM, THE LAWS OF WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION: DEBATING THE 
ENEMY COMBATANT CASES, at x, xiii–xix (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2005) (describing the lack of consensus 
in applying law to the GWOT); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2107–27 (2005) (discussing the AUMF’s applica-
tion to the GWOT); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2045–49 (discussing Hamdi, Hamdan, Rasul, and 
Padilla); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay 
on Law and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 355–58 (2010) (evaluating the Court’s GWOT 
decisions); Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. 
Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2073–74 (2005) (criticizing a conflict of laws approach to Rasul); Ker-
mit Roosevelt III, Guantanamo and the Conflict of Laws: Rasul and Beyond, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2017, 
2019–30 (2005) (analyzing constitutional rights’ geographic reach after Rasul); Geoffrey R. Stone, Na-
tional Security v. Civil Liberties, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2203, 2206–07, 2211–12 (2007) (differentiating past 
judicial deference from the current focus on civil liberties); Andrew E. Taslitz, Temporal Adversarial-
ism, Criminal Justice, and the Rehnquist Court: The Sluggish Life of Political Factfinding, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1589, 1601 (2006) (arguing against quick presidential action even in light of perceived crises “exempli-
fied by the War on Crime and the War on Terror”); Mark Tushnet, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION 
IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 1, 2 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) (describing two 
generations of scholarship concerning war and the Constitution); David Cole, No Reason to Believe: 
Radical Skepticism, Emergency Power, and Constitutional Constraint, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1329, 1329 
(2008) (reviewing POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 116) (“Most observers of American history look 
back with regret and shame on our nation’s record of respecting civil liberties in times of crisis.”). 
161  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); see Robert J. Pu-
shaw, Jr., Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically 
Pragmatic?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1975, 1975–76 (2009) (describing Hamdi, Rasul, and the ensuing 
“battle” between the Court and the political branches). 
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tional law.162  The Court did not address these claims on the merits; instead, 
it focused on whether there was jurisdiction even to consider such argu-
ments.163 
Over strong governmental protest, Rasul held that federal statutes 
granted habeas jurisdiction because the petitioners’ ultimate custodians 
were “within [a district court’s] jurisdiction” in the District of Columbia.164  
The detainees’ location in Guantánamo was jurisdictionally irrelevant.165  
The Court also rejected the government’s claim that federal habeas statutes 
do not apply extraterritorially.  The United States’ indefinite lease and 
complete control over Guantánamo rendered the naval base “within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.”166  According to the Court, Guan-
tánamo detainees were not “extraterritorial” at all, and thus possessed 
jurisdictional opportunities much like prisoners held in the fifty states.167 
A major challenge for the Rasul majority was how to reconcile its de-
cision to grant alien detainees habeas jurisdiction in Guantánamo Bay with 
Eisentrager’s denial of habeas jurisdiction to alien detainees in postwar 
Germany.  The Court ostensibly distinguished Eisentrager on technical 
grounds, but the two cases were so normatively opposite that they seemed 
irreconcilable.168  Whereas Eisentrager had denied jurisdiction over a broad 
swath of executive activity based on military necessity,169 Rasul declared 
that judicial supervision over executive detention was immensely important 
“in wartime as well as in times of peace.”170  The President’s ability to in-
voke Korematsu-era deference was correspondingly reduced. 
The majority’s decision to unceremoniously shelve Eisentrager caused 
Justice Kennedy to concur separately.171  Yet Kennedy’s analysis contra-
dicted Korematsu-era doctrine just as much as the majority’s did.  Justice 
Kennedy sought to transform the clear jurisdictional rule from Eisentrag-
er—no habeas for extraterritorial aliens—into a web of interdependent fac-
 
162  542 U.S. at 470–72. 
163  Id. at 485. 
164  Id. at 478–79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
165  See id. 
166  Id. at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
167  Id. at 480–81. 
168  See id. at 485–89 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the majority should 
have followed Eisentrager’s reasoning but distinguishing Rasul from Eisentrager on factual grounds). 
169  Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 774 (1950) (“Executive power over enemy aliens, unde-
layed and unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time se-
curity.”); id. at 779 (“It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than 
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in his own civil 
courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at 
home.  Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial 
and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of the United States.”). 
170  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 474. 
171  Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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tors that determine whether aliens outside the United States can have habeas 
jurisdiction.172  Moreover, he used this pseudo-Eisentrager “framework” to 
declare that Rasul’s indefinite detention without trial was “a weaker case of 
military necessity” than had appeared in Eisentrager.173  Kennedy cited no 
proof for this military comparison, and he discarded the government’s pro-
test to the contrary.174  Instead of accepting the military’s own judgments, as 
the Korematsu-era Court had done, he mused that uncharged wartime de-
tention might “be justified by military necessity for a matter of weeks; but 
as the period of detention stretches from months to years, the case for . . . 
military exigencies becomes weaker.”175  All of this nuanced line drawing is 
antithetical to Korematsu-era principles.  The very notion that Article III 
judges should decide whether military detainees should be formally 
charged—much less whether they should be informally detained for weeks 
and months as opposed to years—contradicts everything that the World 
War II precedents’ uncompromising adherence to executive factual and pol-
icy judgments once stood for.176 
Rasul’s policy significance has attracted great academic discussion,177 
yet the ruling’s doctrinal effect on Korematsu-era principles has escaped at-
tention.  In part, such oversight stems from the Court’s nominally minimal-
ist style.178  Rasul addressed two profound constitutional issues: whether the 
President can detain individuals in a “legal black hole” and how courts 
should treat claims of wartime necessity.179  Instead of taking these issues 
head on, the Court’s opinion stressed its narrow statutory context and thus 
did not acknowledge or justify its broad shift in judicial deference.  As a re-
sult, Rasul’s full precedential and structural consequences remained unclear 
until the Court returned to Guantánamo detainees’ habeas petitions in Bou-
mediene v. Bush.180 
 
172  Id. at 485–86. 
173  Id. at 488. 
174  See id.; Brief for the Respondents at 1–4, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (No. 03-334) (arguing that mili-
tary necessity justified the indefinite detention of enemy combatants). 
175  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 488. 
176  Cf. id. at 495 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Justice Kennedy’s approach provides enticing law-
school-exam imponderables in an area where certainty is called for.”). 
177  See, e.g., HOWARD BALL, BUSH, THE DETAINEES, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR 87 (2007); Erwin Chemerinsky, Detainees, 68 ALB. L. 
REV. 1119, 1122–23 (2005); Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 6, at 2058–61; Roosevelt, supra note 160, at 
2019–30. 
178  For extensive discussion of the Court’s minimalism, see Neil S. Siegel, A Theory in Search of a 
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951 (2005), and 
Cass R. Sunstein, Testing Minimalism: A Reply, 104 MICH. L. REV. 123 (2005). 
179  See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475–80 (majority opinion); id. at 488 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  For the quoted phrase, see Johan Steyn, Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L 
& COMP. L.Q. 1 (2004). 
180  See infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)). 
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2. Hamdi and Korematsu.—Hamdi represented another serious blow 
to Korematsu-era principles.  Yaser Esam Hamdi was a United States citi-
zen captured in Afghanistan and held in a South Carolina military brig.181  
Because Hamdi was a citizen held within the United States, there were none 
of Rasul’s questions about habeas jurisdiction or the extraterritorial force of 
federal laws.182  Instead, the issue was whether and how federal courts could 
second-guess the President’s factual claim that Hamdi was an “enemy com-
batant” who could be held without charges until hostilities ceased.183  After 
extensive litigation in the district court, the government proffered a military 
bureaucrat’s sworn statement that Hamdi had been “affiliated” with a Tali-
ban military unit, had “received weapons training,” and had carried arms 
against American allies in Afghanistan.184  Hamdi argued that he was an aid 
worker at the wrong time and place.  When the case reached the Supreme 
Court, the government’s brief decried Hamdi’s argument as “constitutional-
ly intolerable”185—raising the ominous possibility that the President might 
somehow refuse to “tolerate” a ruling against the government. 
Hamdi did not produce a majority opinion, but eight Justices rejected 
the Korematsu-era principle that courts should leave disputes over alleged 
enemy combatants to unsupervised presidential judgment.186  Justice 
O’Connor wrote for a four-vote plurality that, although Congress in the 
AUMF had authorized military detention of enemy combatants in Afghanis-
tan, constitutional due process required stronger evidence and better proce-
dures than the government had used in detaining Hamdi.187  O’Connor 
memorably declared that “a state of war is not a blank check” authorizing 
presidential abuse.188  On the other hand, she also opined that—contrary to 
constitutional requirements in other contexts—the military could detain 
United States citizens based on hearsay evidence, evaluated by a panel of 
military officials employing a presumption in favor of the government.189 
 
181  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004). 
182  Id. at 541 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (not-
ing that even the government conceded the Court’s jurisdiction to hear Hamdi’s habeas claim). 
183  Id. at 524 (plurality opinion). 
184  Id. at 512–13; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing the 
government’s initial refusal to proffer any supporting documents to the district court). 
185  Brief for the Respondents at 46–47, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696). 
186  Daniel A. Farber, Justice Stevens, Habeas Jurisdiction, and the War on Terror, 43 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 945, 958 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court split in its rationale in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, but agreed 
almost unanimously on the key point: eight Justices rejected the government’s position that it had an un-
reviewable right to detain ‘enemy combatants’ without a hearing.” (footnote omitted)); see also Hamdi, 
542 U.S. at 579 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s 
war powers, and we lack the expertise and capacity to second-guess that decision.”). 
187  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517, 532–33 (plurality opinion). 
188  Id. at 536. 
189  Id. at 533–34. 
105:983  (2011) Ending the Korematsu Era 
 1019
Despite O’Connor’s concessions to military necessity, her opinion 
concluded—without any apparent factual basis—that giving detainees basic 
notice and a hearing was “unlikely . . . [to] have the dire impact on the cen-
tral functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts.”190  Although 
this reasoning represented an arguably mild defeat for the government, and 
although it affirmed the political branches’ general responsibility for war 
making, O’Connor’s opinion explicitly rejected the government’s broadest 
claims concerning military necessity.191  By contrast, Korematsu-era defe-
rence would have insisted that judges know nothing at all about detention 
policies’ “impact on the central functions of warmaking” in Afghanistan 
and the GWOT.192 
Four Justices thought that O’Connor’s mild repudiation of Korematsu-
era deference did not go far enough.  Justice Souter’s opinion, which Justice 
Ginsburg joined, attacked Korematsu directly.  The Non-Detention Act 
(NDA) states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by 
the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.”193  Souter ex-
plained that the NDA was enacted in 1971 precisely because “Congress 
meant to preclude another episode like the one described in Korematsu v. 
United States.”194  With respect to modern times, even though Hamdi’s de-
tention was not race-based and even though GWOT detainees are far less 
numerous than Japanese-American detainees in World War II, Souter used 
the NDA as a legal–historical link between these two distant periods. 
For the NDA to be an effective safeguard against presidential abuse, 
Souter wrote that the statute must require a “clear statement of authorization 
to detain” instead of “vague congressional authority” like the AUMF.195  
Souter bolstered his conclusion with arguments about constitutional struc-
ture that contradict Korematsu-era deference to the Executive: 
 
190  Id. at 534. 
191  See supra notes 187–88 and accompanying text; cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (rejecting the government’s argument for indefinite detention without legal 
process).  For O’Connor’s endorsement of moderate judicial deference, see Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531, 
where she claims that, “[w]ithout doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of war-
making” should be left to the “politically accountable” branches and notes “the reluctance of the courts 
‘to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national security affairs.’”  (quoting Dep’t 
of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988)). 
192  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534.  Even though Justice O’Connor grounded the President’s detention au-
thority in her interpretation of “longstanding law-of-war principles,” she also suggested that “[i]f the 
practical circumstances of a given conflict are entirely unlike those of the conflicts that informed the de-
velopment of the law of war, that understanding may unravel,” id. at 521, thereby opening to challenge 
all detention policies in the decidedly nonstandard GWOT.  See John K. Setear, A Forest with No Trees: 
The Supreme Court and International Law in the 2003 Term, 91 VA. L. REV. 579, 632 (2005). 
193  18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006). 
194  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 543 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment). 
195  Id. at 543–45. 
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In a government of separated powers, deciding finally on what is a reasonable 
degree of guaranteed liberty whether in peace or war (or some condition in be-
tween) is not well entrusted to the Executive Branch of Government, whose 
particular responsibility is to maintain security.  For reasons of inescapable 
human nature, the branch of the Government asked to counter a serious threat 
is not the branch on which to rest the Nation’s entire reliance in striking the 
balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the way to victory; 
the responsibility for security will naturally amplify the claim that security le-
gitimately raises.196 
As Souter observed, the history of presidential excess in World War II vi-
vidly confirms that one need not imagine bad executive motives to justify 
barriers against extrajudicial detention.197  Many commentators have not 
given due attention to Souter’s historical approach because it rested on sta-
tutory grounds and because it described Korematsu’s errors with a light 
touch.198  In my judgment, however, Souter’s analysis of war powers is the 
most compelling in at least five decades. 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, rejected the plurality’s consti-
tutional compromise involving due process.199  Because Congress did not 
suspend habeas corpus, Scalia insisted that the Constitution required citi-
zens like Hamdi to be either prosecuted in a civilian court or set free.200  
Scalia’s main doctrinal hurdle, however, was the Korematsu-era Quirin 
precedent, which had allowed a United States citizen to be detained and ul-
timately electrocuted without any civilian prosecution or suspension of ha-
beas.201  Scalia attacked Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour,” as 
misinterpreting the Constitution’s original and Reconstruction-era meaning, 
and as not controlling Hamdi’s result.202  Scalia’s broad assault on Quirin 
 
196  Id. at 545; see also GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 71 (quoting an executive lawyer’s objection 
that, if the OLC ruled a particular way, “the blood of the hundred thousand people who die in the next 
attack will be on your hands”); id. at 189 (“[The government’s] internal skittishness is not something we 
can wish or will away.  For generations the Terror Presidency will be characterized by an unremitting 
fear of devastating attack, an obsession with preventing the attack, and a proclivity to act aggressively 
and preemptively to do so.”); 6 JAMES MADISON, Letters of Helvidius No. 1, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1906) (“Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of 
things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded.” (em-
phasis omitted)). 
197  See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542–45 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment) (discussing the “cautionary example of the internments in World War II”). 
198  For scholarship that draws attention to Souter’s argument about constitutional structure, see 
Cole, supra note 160, at 1356; Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 93–96; 
Thomas P. Crocker, Torture, with Apologies, 86 TEX. L. REV. 569, 593 (2008) (book review). 
199  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
200  Id. at 572. 
201  See id. at 569–72 (discussing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942)). 
202  Id. at 569–71. 
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shows that even vigorous proponents of presidential power have raised se-
rious doubts about at least some Korematsu-era precedents.203 
Hamdi’s internal divisions make it hard to interpret the Court’s ruling, 
yet we have seen that each of the three opinions that rejected the govern-
ment’s position (encompassing eight of nine Justices) also rejected impor-
tant elements of the Korematsu era.  O’Connor’s flexible pragmatism 
implied an institutional commitment to judicial line drawing, especially 
when core procedural protections are involved.  Souter’s reference to histor-
ical mistakes confirmed his skepticism that even well-intentioned, well-
informed Presidents may not be fully trustworthy.  And Scalia used histori-
cal analysis to deprecate the unanimous Korematsu-era precedent of Quirin 
on which the Bush Administration had relied most deeply.  Although Ham-
di’s holding was arguably permissive regarding the President’s power to de-
tain United States citizens, the Justices’ reasoning showed that a doctrinal 
transformation might be in the works.204 
3. Hamdan and Yamashita.—Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court’s first 
military commissions case, was (like Rasul and Hamdi) subtle in rejecting 
the Korematsu era.205  Military commissions at Guantánamo Bay began in 
August 2004, using procedures, decisionmakers, and appellate mechanisms 
 
203  Id.  For discussion of Quirin’s use as precedent, see Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Consti-
tutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 868–69 (2006), 
and Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and the Charming 
Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. REV. 293, 310–14 (2005).  Justice Scalia has vigorously supported presidential 
power in other cases as well.  See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 506 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Commander in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the internment of combatants 
at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of bringing the cumbersome machinery of our do-
mestic courts into military affairs. . . .  For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, 
and in frustration of our military commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adven-
turism of the worst sort.”); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Ar-
ticle II, § 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States.’ . . .  [T]his does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”). 
204  Some scholars early in the twenty-first century tended to view the GWOT cases narrowly, as ex-
emplifying little more than the “Youngstown principle” that is discussed supra in notes 71–74 and ac-
companying text.  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699–704 
(2008) (explaining that, with few exceptions, “recent scholarship still shares the conventional post-
Youngstown orientation”); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarian-
ism and Executive Unilateralism: An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 
5 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 28 (2004) (describing Jackson’s opinion in Youngstown as “the founda-
tion of the constitutional inquiry”); Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 
108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1028 (2008) (“By September 11, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court had issued 
four decisions in ‘war on terror’ cases . . . .  Each of these decisions focused primarily on issues of 
process, while more substantive questions were left lurking in the background.” (footnotes omitted)). 
205  Some readers may wonder why the Court was so often “subtle” in its treatment of Korematsu-
era precedents.  The shortest answer is that no one outside the Court can be sure, but one can easily spe-
culate that the Court’s middle votes (O’Connor and Kennedy) were perhaps loathe to limit the President 
more than necessary.  I should stress that this Article’s analysis does not rely on any view of particular 
Justices’ motives. 
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that were much more defendant-friendly than the military commissions that 
had been upheld in Quirin and Yamashita.206  Nonetheless, the Court in 
Hamdan ruled that the commissions’ procedures were inadequate and had 
to be revised.207 
The Court initially considered a jurisdictional objection concerning the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA)208 that would resurface in later 
GWOT litigation.209  As a congressional response to Rasul, the DTA expli-
citly withdrew habeas jurisdiction for Guantánamo detainees and allowed 
detainees to challenge military commissions’ activities only in the D.C. 
Circuit after a final judgment had issued and administrative remedies had 
been exhausted.210  Hamdan did not follow these procedural rules, and the 
government argued that federal courts therefore lacked jurisdiction.211  The 
Supreme Court disagreed, holding the DTA inapplicable to habeas petitions 
like Hamdan’s that were pending when the statute became law.212 
On the merits, the Court criticized procedures that were to be used in 
Hamdan’s military commission, including the presiding officer’s discretion 
to “close” certain proceedings and to hide from Hamdan and civilian coun-
sel certain evidence against him.213  The Court also discussed potential flaws 
in the military commission’s evidentiary rules and appellate review.214 
According to the Court, these procedures violated the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), which imposed a “principle of procedural parity” 
and presumptively required “uniformity” between unlawful enemy comba-
tants’ military commissions and courts-martial for United States military 
personnel.215  As I have discussed elsewhere, Hamdan’s analysis is difficult 
to defend using ordinary rules of statutory interpretation.216  Instead, the 
 
206  See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Office of the Assistant Sec’y of Def., No. 820-04 (Aug. 
24, 2004), available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=7667; Goldsmith & 
Sunstein, supra note 125, at 284. 
207  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 617–33, 635–36 (2006). 
208  Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, 
and 42 U.S.C.). 
209  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572–75; see infra Part II.B.4 (discussing a similar jurisdictional issue). 
210  119 Stat. at 2741–43; see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 572–75 (discussing the DTA). 
211  Brief for Respondents at 7, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184) (“The DTA removes jurisdic-
tion over a broad class of actions by Guantanamo detainees, including this action, and establishes an ex-
clusive review mechanism for challenging the final decisions of [Combatant Status Review Tribunals] 
or military commissions in the District of Columbia Circuit.  The DTA establishes a statutory rule of 
abstention that eliminates all jurisdiction over petitioner’s pre-trial complaints about his military com-
mission.”). 
212  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 575–76. 
213  See id. at 613–35. 
214  Id. at 614–16. 
215  Id. at 619–20. 
216  See Green, supra note 45, at 162–64; Burt Neuborne, Spheres of Justice: Who Decides?, 
74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1090, 1112–13 (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and Na-
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Court anchored its “uniformity principle” in military commissions’ long 
historical role as what experts have called “our common-law war court.”217  
Citing authority from the Civil War, the Progressive Era, Korea, and Viet-
nam, the Court described the uniformity principle as a “background as-
sumption”218 even though it did not explicitly appear in any binding legal 
rules. 
For purposes of this Article, two aspects of Hamdan need comment.  
First, the Court’s conclusions about military commissions relied on its own 
assessment of military need, much like Kennedy’s analysis in Rasul and 
O’Connor’s approach in Hamdi.219  The Hamdan majority explained that 
“[t]he military commission, a tribunal neither mentioned in the Constitution 
nor created by statute, was born of military necessity.”220  In Hamdan’s par-
ticular case, however, the Court rejected presidential claims that military 
necessity required special adjudicative processes.221  The Court’s seemingly 
narrow holding left open whether future Presidents might someday offer 
persuasive arguments for stripped-down military procedures.  But as with 
other GWOT cases, the very notion that federal courts could supervise and 
reject a President’s assertion of military necessity completely undercut Ko-
rematsu-era deference. 
A second important issue is the Court’s mention of Yamashita as a 
“glaring historical exception” to Hamdan’s uniformity doctrine.222  Contrary 
to Hamdan’s newly minted “principle of procedural parity,”223 General Ya-
 
tional Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4–5, 28, 44.  But see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 
637 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part). 
217  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 690 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 
346–47 & n.10 (1952) (quoting Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crowder)); In re Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1, 20 n.7 (1946) (same); see Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 593 (majority opinion) (noting that military 
commissions are legally authorized “under the Constitution and the common law of war . . . with the ex-
press condition that the President and those under his command comply with the law of war”); id. at 595 
(plurality opinion) (“The common law governing military commissions may be gleaned from past prac-
tice and what sparse legal precedent exists.”); id. at 598 (“All parties agree that Colonel Winthrop’s trea-
tise accurately describes the common law governing military commissions . . . .”); id. at 602 
(“Congress . . . incorporated by reference the common law of war” with respect to military commissions 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 613 (majority opinion) (“The UCMJ conditions the Presi-
dent’s use of military commissions on compliance . . . with the American common law of war . . . .”). 
218  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at at 617–25. 
219  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring). 
220  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 590. 
221  Id. at 624 (“[I]t is not evident to us why [the danger of terrorism] should require, in the case of 
Hamdan’s trial, any variance from the rules that govern courts-martial.” (emphasis added)); id. at 632–
33 (“At a minimum, a military commission ‘can be “regularly constituted” by the standards of our mili-
tary justice system only if some practical need explains deviations from court-martial practice.’  As we 
have explained, no such need has been demonstrated here.” (quoting id. at 645 (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in part)) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
222  Id. at 617–20. 
223  Id. at 617. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1024 
mashita’s military commission—like that of Quirin and other World War II 
defendants—used less protective procedures than courts-martial that tried 
American soldiers.224  Yet Yamashita’s conviction was upheld by a vote of 
six Justices to two, and he was later executed by hanging.225  If the modern 
Court had accepted Yamashita as good law, then all subsequent “parities” 
or “uniformities” between military commission procedures and courts-
martial might have been interpreted as mere choices of military policy, ra-
ther than the binding legal requirement applied by the Court in Hamdan.226  
Yamashita thus threatened to unravel Hamdan’s “uniformity” doctrine to its 
very core. 
The Hamdan majority replied by bluntly announcing that Yamashita’s 
precedential force had “been seriously undermined by post-World War II 
developments.”227  Citing ancillary changes to the UCMJ and international 
law, Hamdan concluded that “[t]he most notorious exception to the prin-
ciple of uniformity . . . has been stripped of its precedential value.”228  The 
doctrinal importance of these statements has not been fully appreciated; at 
the time, they represented the Court’s most direct repudiations of Koremat-
su-era precedent. 
4. Boumediene Beyond Youngstown.—Boumediene v. Bush is the 
most recent case to analyze wartime military commissions, and its rejection 
of Korematsu-era principles has clarified and strengthened the Court’s other 
twenty-first-century precedents.229  Immediately after Hamdan, Congress 
enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).230  The statute again 
restricted habeas jurisdiction, providing that federal courts could review 
alien enemy combatants’ detentions only through D.C. Circuit review of fi-
nal decisions by administrative Combatant Status Review Tribunals, Ad-
ministrative Review Boards, and military commissions.231  To avoid a 
replay of Hamdan, Congress stated that the MCA’s habeas-stripping provi-
sion should apply to both pending and future litigation about detainees’ 
rights.232 Boumediene’s habeas petitions came from aliens who were held at 
 
224  In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 18–20 (1946) (discussing differences between procedural require-
ments for military commissions and tribunals for American service personnel). 
225  Id. at 5, 26, 41; FERREN, supra note 12, at 1; Ferren, supra note 92, at 54. 
226  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 710 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
227  Id. at 618 (majority opinion); cf. supra notes 124–41 and accompanying text (discussing late 
twentieth-century changes within American legalism and international law). 
228  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 620 (emphasis added). 
229  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
230  Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.). 
231  Id. § 3(a)(1); David A. Martin, Judicial Review and the Military Commissions Act: On Striking 
the Right Balance, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 344, 357 (2007). 
232  MCA § 7(b); see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting); supra notes 209–12 and 
accompanying text (discussing Hamdan and the DTA). 
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Guantánamo Bay without charges as enemy combatants.233  Instead of fol-
lowing the MCA’s procedures, the petitioners claimed that the statute itself 
was an unconstitutional suspension of habeas corpus.234 
In accepting petitioners’ arguments, the Court took a significant step 
beyond its other twenty-first-century precedents.  The Court in Rasul, 
Hamdi, and Hamdan had never required the Court to contradict joint deci-
sions by the President and Congress about military necessity under 
“Youngstown Category One.”  Instead, the Court’s early GWOT cases used 
unorthodox statutory interpretation to characterize the President as defying 
Congress’s will, and then sided with Congress.235  By contrast, the Boume-
diene Court faced repeated judgments by Congress and the President that 
Guantánamo detainees should not receive habeas relief.236  Both political 
branches had crafted special review procedures to accommodate ongoing 
military conflicts,237 and this raised the “Korematsu problem” in its purest 
form: When Congress and the President bend legal norms to accommodate 
asserted military necessity, how can any court second-guess that judgment?  
Justice Jackson’s Youngstown framework accords this kind of joint action 
the highest deference, and the Korematsu era arguably stood for the view 
that courts could not second-guess the political branches in such contexts. 
Yet that is indeed what happened.  Boumediene parroted Kennedy’s 
Rasul concurrence, this time as a matter of constitutional rather than statu-
tory interpretation, and this time supported by five Justices instead of just 
one.238  Adopting Kennedy’s view of Eisentrager as a multifactor web, the 
Court evaluated whether detainees should receive habeas relief by deter-
mining whether such proceedings would cause “practical obstacles.”239  The 
Court brushed aside the President’s claims about military practicalities and 
held that habeas review would impose only ordinary “incremental expendi-
ture[s] of resources.”240  The Court found “no credible arguments that the 
military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus 
courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.”241  Based on the 
 
233  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 732 (majority opinion). 
234  Id. at 732–33. 
235  See supra Part II.B.1–3. 
236  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 831 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see DTA, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 
2739 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); MCA § 7(b). 
237  See 109 CONG. REC. H7537–49 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006). 
238  Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 755, 762, 766, 769 (majority opinion, authored by Kennedy, 
J.) (citing Justice Kennedy’s Rasul concurrence as authoritative precedent), with Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 
466, 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (expressing statutory analysis and conclusions that no other Justice 
joined). 
239  Id. at 766. 
240  Id. at 769.  But see Brief for the Respondents at 5, Boumediene, 553 U.S. 723 (No. 06-1195) (ar-
guing that detainee litigation was “consuming enormous resources and disrupting the operation of the 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base”). 
241  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769 (emphasis added). 
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Court’s own unflinching factual judgment, the majority concluded that 
“there are few practical barriers to the running of the writ” and that, “[t]o 
the extent barriers arise, habeas corpus procedures likely can be modified” 
by federal district courts themselves.242 
To be clear, the government’s briefs had indeed offered “arguments” 
disputing these points; the problem was judicial disbelief that these asser-
tions were “credible.”243  The Boumediene majority thus retained judicial 
supervision of military detainees at a judicially determined level of rigor 
even though both political branches had made a deliberately different 
choice.  Such skeptical review of presidential authority, at its constitutional 
apex in Youngstown’s Category One, would have been quite unacceptable 
in the Korematsu era. 
Boumediene expressed two other attacks on Korematsu-era deference.  
First, the Court held that habeas jurisdiction was especially important be-
cause the President did not use quasi-judicial procedures to determine 
which detainees could be held indefinitely.244  “Within the Constitution’s 
separation-of-powers structure, few exercises of judicial power are as legi-
timate or as necessary as the responsibility to hear challenges to the authori-
ty of the Executive to imprison a person.”245  This language invoked the 
legalist shift that undermined the Korematsu era, and it elided the funda-
mental Korematsu-era distinction between wartime and peacetime adjudica-
tion.246  For Boumediene’s majority, the petitioners were no longer just 
enemy aliens or combatants on a global battlefield.  They were also “per-
sons” who had been “imprison[ed]” by the Executive.247  And like other de-
tained persons, they presumptively deserved constitutional procedures to 
test their confinement’s legality in federal court. 
Second, the Boumediene majority explicitly denied “undermin[ing] the 
Executive’s powers as Commander in Chief.”248  On the contrary, the Court 
claimed that “the exercise of those powers is vindicated, not eroded, when 
confirmed by the Judicial Branch”249—as though the President should 
somehow be grateful for the Court’s detailed supervision.  In the Korematsu 
era, judicial intervention to preserve fundamental fairness and constitutional 
structure was celebrated in dissenting opinions if at all.250  Boumediene and 
 
242  Id. at 770. 
243  Id. at 769.  But see Brief for the Respondents, supra note 240, at 5–6, 10–11. 
244  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 783. 
245  Id. at 797. 
246  See supra notes 124–30 and accompanying text. 
247  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 797; cf. id. at 743 (“[T]he Constitution’s separation-of-powers struc-
ture, like the substantive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protects persons as well 
as citizens, foreign nationals . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
248  Id. at 797. 
249  Id. 
250  See Eisentrager v. Johnson, 339 U.S. 763, 795 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting); In re Yamashita, 
327 U.S. 1, 43 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225–26 
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its twenty-first-century cousins thus represent an institutional realignment 
that has bolstered federal courts’ influence and correspondingly limited Ko-
rematsu-era precedents. 
5. Embarrassing Aftereffects.—Perhaps the most striking departure 
from the Korematsu era does not involve substantive precedent at all; in-
stead, it concerns the modern Court’s sense of timing in war powers cases.  
In Quirin, Hirabayashi, and Korematsu, the Court not only approved the 
President’s wartime actions but did so very quickly.251  Twenty-first-century 
cases have modestly restricted presidential action, and they have moved 
very slowly.252  Thus, almost ten years after detainees arrived in Guantána-
mo, and seven years after the Supreme Court considered such detention’s 
legality, it remains uncertain whether those detainees have due process 
rights, what such rights might require, exactly whom the government may 
detain in the GWOT, and whether the government has breached any rights 
that may exist in Guantánamo.253  Nor has the Court resolved similar ques-
tions at other military bases or at CIA dark sites.254 
 
(1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 233–34 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 244–45 (Jackson, J., dis-
senting). 
251  See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 125, at 264–70 (describing how in Quirin the politicians, 
media, and public largely agreed that “[a]lmost everyone seemed to call for the saboteurs’ execution—
the sooner the better,” and the Supreme Court obliged); Rostow, supra note 6, at 489 (noting with re-
spect to Korematsu and Hirabayashi that “[o]ur war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of 
Japanese descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary and mistaken”). 
252  Cf. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 800–01 (Souter, J., concurring) (“It is in fact the very lapse of four 
years from the time Rasul put everyone on notice that habeas process was available to Guantanamo pris-
oners, and the lapse of six years since some of these prisoners were captured and incarcerated, that stand 
at odds with the repeated suggestions of the dissenters that these cases should be seen as a judicial victo-
ry in a contest for power between the Court and the political branches. . . .  After six years of sustained 
executive detentions in Guantanamo, subject to habeas jurisdiction but without any actual habeas scruti-
ny, today’s decision is no judicial victory, but an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, 
and the obligation of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to prisoners and to the Na-
tion.”); id. at 807 n.1 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that such delays are as much due to courts’ 
slowness as to the vagaries of democratic politics). 
253  See id. at 791–92 (majority opinion); JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL33180, ENEMY COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN 
FEDERAL COURT 37–38 (2010); cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Military Commissions Act, Habeas Corpus, 
and the Geneva Conventions, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 322, 332–33 (2007) (suggesting that Guantánamo de-
tainees may not have a constitutional right to habeas corpus review).  The first detainees arrived in 
Guantánamo in December 2001, and the first GWOT cases were decided by the Court in June 2004.  See 
supra notes 148, 161 and accompanying text. 
254  Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan has been likened to “the next Guantanamo” for its current 
extrajudicial status.  Del Quentin Wilber, In Courts, Afghanistan Air Base May Become Next Guanta-
namo, WASH. POST, June 29, 2008, at A14; see Jonathan Hafetz, Guantánamo and the “Next Frontier” 
of Detainee Issues, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 699, 700 (2007); see also MAYER, supra note 1, at 145 
(“The CIA . . . had to hold its prisoners somewhere beyond the reach of the American legal system, and 
that was the impetus for its ‘black site’ program.”).  On September 6, 2006, President Bush announced 
that “he had emptied the black sites and transferred these suspects to Guantánamo Bay.”  MAYER, supra 
note 1, at 325. 
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The Court’s glacial pace of decisionmaking must seem like “justice 
denied” to the detainees and their advocates.255  Yet an unnoticed side-effect 
of such slowness is that—unlike the Korematsu era—the modern Court has 
seen real-time changes in the President’s credibility before making any 
broad decision to approve or reject his choices. 
To be clear, there is no evidence that the Bush Administration mis-
stated facts in litigation concerning the GWOT as the Roosevelt Adminis-
tration did in Korematsu.  Yet presidential credibility has remained an 
important question below the surface of modern case law,256 and the first 
round of GWOT decisions witnessed an especially unfortunate juxtaposi-
tion.  On the morning of April 28, 2004, the government’s lawyer in Rums-
feld v. Padilla emphatically told the Court that the United States does not 
torture detainees—not mildly and not ever.257  That very evening, national 
television broadcast photographs of terrible abuse at the Abu Ghraib pris-
on.258 
Outside the courtroom, President Bush’s credibility was challenged by 
military setbacks in Iraq.  The United States failed to discover weapons of 
mass destruction, which had been a principal justification for interven-
tion.259  Links between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda proved much weaker 
 
255  See, e.g., MAYER, supra note 1, at 332 (describing the slow legal process); Neal Devins, Talk 
Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy Combatants, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 
491, 492–94 (2010) (bemoaning the Court’s lack of progress); Martinez, supra note 204, at 1029 (“After 
years of litigation, hundreds of detainees continue to languish in possibly illegal custody . . . .  The 
Court’s decisions are less like landmarks and more like small signposts directing the traveler to contin-
ue . . . .”). 
256  The political climates during World War II and the GWOT as well as media coverage of the two 
wars have exacerbated problems with presidential credibility.  During the Korematsu era, the Court fo-
cused on national security; in today’s GWOT, the Court has focused on preserving fundamental rights.  
See Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 125, at 282; Green, supra note 45, at 143–44. 
257  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49–50, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-
6696)  (“MR. CLEMENT: . . . I wouldn’t want there to be any misunderstanding about this.  It’s also the 
judgment of those involved in this process that the last thing you want to do is torture somebody or try to 
do something along those lines.”); Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–23, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 
426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (“QUESTION: Suppose the executive says mild torture we think will help 
get . . . information.  It’s not a soldier who does something against the Code of Military Justice, but it’s 
an executive command.  Some systems do that to get information.  MR. CLEMENT: Well, our executive 
doesn’t . . . .” (emphasis added)).  But cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 23, Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (No. 
03-1027) (“MR. CLEMENT: . . . You have to recognize that in situations where there is war . . . you 
have to trust the executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved in 
things like [avoiding and punishing torture by United States officials].”). 
258  See David G. Savage, Prison Scandal Could Sway High Court, L.A. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at 
A8. 
259  See Julian Borger, Iraq Had No WMD: The Final Verdict, GUARDIAN (Sept. 18, 2004), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/sep/18/iraq.iraq1; see also Press Release, U.S. Senate Select 
Comm. on Intelligence, Senate Intelligence Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq 
Intelligence (June 5, 2008), available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775. 
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than the Bush Administration had claimed.260  And the President’s “Mission 
Accomplished” banner in May 2003 came to represent broader concerns 
about the Administration’s flawed planning and execution.261 
Since 2002, the government has released hundreds of Guantánamo de-
tainees or transferred them to other countries for custody.262  For some of 
these individuals, there was never any valid basis for their detention; for 
others, the facts are less clear.263  In either event, some released detainees 
have subsequently condemned the United States’ detention and military 
policies, and some have commenced or recommenced battle against United 
States troops.264  Such problems illustrate disturbing imperfections through-
out the government’s detention and release policies at Guantánamo. 
Likewise, the Bush Administration’s results in GWOT litigation may 
have weakened presidential credibility in the Supreme Court.  The Bush 
Administration was partly a victim of its own success.  Even after the Pres-
ident’s courtroom losses began to accumulate, post-9/11 attacks did not oc-
cur, thus suggesting that asserted security risks were not so severe or that 
the Administration could work around adverse legal rulings.  Through this 
cycle of legal defeats, each successive case, with new assertions about 
threats and military needs, risked being even further discounted. 
The President also suffered credibility problems in specific GWOT 
cases.  For example, the government in Hamdi and its companion case, Pa-
dilla, claimed that national security threats kept prevented the petitioners 
from being criminally charged in ordinary civilian courts.265  Indeed, the 
government argued that even to proffer significant evidence of Hamdi’s 
enemy combatant status might be “constitutionally intolerable.”266 
 
260  See Douglas Jehl, Pentagon Reportedly Skewed C.I.A.’s View of Qaeda Tie, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
22, 2004, at A10. 
261  See Ken Auletta, Fortress Bush: How the White House Keeps the Press Under Control, NEW 
YORKER (Jan. 19, 2004), http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/01/19/040119fa_fact_auletta?
currentPage=all.  For a somewhat grim overview of the Bush Administration’s involvement with Iraq, 
see Fredrik Logevall, Anatomy of an Unnecessary War: The Iraq Invasion, in THE PRESIDENCY OF 
GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 88. 
262  See Josh White, 18 More Detainees Leave Guantanamo, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 2005, at A22. 
263  See Thomas B. Wilner, Op-Ed., We Don’t Need Guantanamo Bay, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2008, 
at A19 (“We now know . . . that many Guantanamo detainees never fought against anyone; they were 
simply turned over by Northern Alliance and Pakistani warlords for bounties of up to $25,000. . . .  We 
can reduce Guantanamo’s population significantly simply by sending home detainees who had no busi-
ness being imprisoned in the first place.  And we should.”). 
264  See James Risen, 35 Guantánamo Detainees Are Given to Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2004, 
§ 1, at 35. 
265  See Brief for the Respondents at 44–45, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696) 
(declaring that “penological” and national security interests required limitations on Hamdi’s access to 
courts); Brief for the Petitioner at 4, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027) (arguing 
that Padilla “represents a continuing, present and grave danger to the national security of the United 
States” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
266  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 525. 
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Yet when the Court ordered the government to provide basic notice 
and process, the government did not choose to detain the purportedly dan-
gerous Hamdi and Padilla as enemy combatants.  Instead, Hamdi was re-
leased to full freedom in Saudi Arabia once he agreed to renounce his 
citizenship, never return to the United States, and waive any legal claims 
concerning his detention and interrogation.267  After a period of notable 
foot-dragging, the government ultimately charged Padilla in civilian court 
with criminal conspiracy and thereby mooted all issues concerning his un-
charged executive detention.268  A federal district court convicted and sen-
tenced Padilla to more than seventeen years in prison, which showed both 
that he was guilty of terrorist activity and also that he could have been cri-
minally prosecuted without resorting to uncharged, indefinite military de-
tention.269 
Similarly, in Hamdan, even though the government claimed an urgent 
need for military commissions, such exigency seemed harder to credit when 
two years passed before Hamdan’s prosecution began.270  In 2008, Hamdan 
was tried under congressionally prescribed procedures, was convicted of 
giving material aid to terrorists, and was acquitted of conspiracy to partici-
pate in terrorism.271  He was sentenced to sixty-six months, minus sixty-one 
months of time served.272  Hamdan was later transferred to Yemen to serve 
the last few weeks of his sentence.273  The government made no effort to de-
tain Hamdan as an uncharged enemy combatant (like the Guantánamo de-
tainees in Rasul and Boumediene, for example) even though the Court’s 
Hamdan opinion explicitly mentioned that as an option.274  Once again, the 
President’s assertions of military danger and desperate need for self-
preservation vanished like mirages into sand.275 
 
267  See Donna Abu-Nasr, Ex-detainee Deported to Saudi Arabia, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12, 2004, § 1, at 
10. 
268  See Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 2005). 
269  See Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1; Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17 Years in Conspiracy Case, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
23, 2008, at A14; Peter Whoriskey, Jury Convicts Jose Padilla of Terror Charges, WASH. POST, Aug. 
17, 2007, at A1. 
270  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 566 (2006). 
271  See William Glaberson, Panel Convicts Bin Laden Driver in Split Verdict, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 
2008, at A1. 
272  See Carol J. Williams, Terror Convict Back to Yemen, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 25, 2008, § 1, at 10. 
273  Id. 
274  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635 (“We have assumed, moreover, the truth of the [Government’s impli-
cit] message . . . that Hamdan is a dangerous individual whose beliefs, if acted upon, would cause great 
harm and even death to innocent civilians, and who would act upon those beliefs if given the opportuni-
ty.  It bears emphasizing that Hamdan does not challenge, and we do not today address, the Govern-
ment’s power to detain him for the duration of active hostilities in order to prevent such harm.”). 
275  Some scholars have argued that society is better off pursuing even exaggerated images of danger 
because there are enormous costs if any threat proves to be real.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, COUNTERING 
TERRORISM: BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 139–50 (2006); RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING 
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A final credibility issue arose in Boumediene, which extended habeas 
jurisdiction and provided judicial review to Guantánamo detainees.276  Here, 
the credibility problem was not with President Bush’s lame-duck Adminis-
tration but with its champions on the Court and campaign trail.  Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in Boumediene issued especially unfortunate rhetoric: 
“[T]oday’s opinion . . . will make the war harder on us.  It will almost cer-
tainly cause more Americans to be killed.”277  Presidential aspirant John 
McCain was similarly dire: “The United States Supreme Court yesterday 
rendered a decision which I think is one of the worst decisions in the history 
of this country. . . .  [O]ur first obligation is the safety and security of this 
nation and the men and women who defend it.  This decision will harm our 
ability to do that.”278 
Now three years later, there is no evidence of Boumediene’s deadly 
impact, nor is there reason to hold one’s breath: Boumediene explicitly de-
clined to grant Guantánamo Bay detainees any due process rights or to de-
tail what those rights (if they exist) might require, nor did the Court order 
the release of even one detainee.279  On the contrary, Chief Justice Roberts 
claimed in dissent that any differences between constitutional habeas re-
view (which Boumediene demanded) and MCA review (which Congress 
had prescribed) might be immeasurably small.280  Such picayune, lawyerly, 
and uncertain consequences make Scalia’s and McCain’s scenes of 
bloodshed very hard to fathom.  Instead, historical evidence from the Ko-
rematsu era and the twenty-first century makes such threats of dead soldiers 
and impending terrorism seem like misguided wolf-crying.  In defending 
presidential claims of military necessity, Scalia and McCain tied their own 
 
SURPRISE ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 108–09 (2005).  Such discussions 
of risk analysis tend to be theoretical in nature, and they are not supported by the historical episodes dis-
cussed in this Article.  Phrased differently, it is theoretically possible that courts could go too far in re-
stricting presidential prerogatives, thereby putting the country in significant danger.  But it is quite 
difficult to find examples of that scenario in the real world. 
276  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771, 787 (2008). 
277  Id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
278  CNN Newsroom (CNN television broadcast June 13, 2008) (transcript available at http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0806/13/cnr.03.html). 
279  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 733 (majority opinion) (“We do not address whether the President has 
authority to detain these petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue.  These and other questions 
regarding the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District Court.”); id. 
at 798 (Souter, J., concurring) (“It bears repeating that our opinion does not address the content of the 
law that governs petitioners’ detention.”); cf. id. at 785 (majority opinion) (“[W]e make no judgment 
whether the [Combatant Status Review Tribunals], as currently constituted, satisfy due process stan-
dards . . . .”). 
280  Cf. id. at 801–02 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The majority merely replaces a review system de-
signed by the people’s representatives with a set of shapeless procedures to be defined by federal courts 
at some future date. . . .  The majority . . . compares the undefined DTA process to an equally undefined 
habeas right—one that is to be given shape only in the future by district courts on a case-by-case ba-
sis. . . .  How the detainees’ claims will be decided . . . is anybody’s guess.  But the habeas process the 
Court mandates will most likely end up looking a lot like the DTA system it replaces . . . .”). 
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credibility to arguments against meddlesome judicial intervention.  Here, as 
in the Korematsu era, that institutional wager has proved to be quite risky.  
When it comes to Supreme Court cases at least, history has shown that 
Presidents exaggerate, and judicial skepticism is warranted far more than 
anyone would prefer. 
Although it is clear that the military in World War II distorted the 
threat of Japanese-American sedition, the full risks of the GWOT are only 
partly knowable from public sources.  Sixty years from now, historians will 
know more about the United States’ threats, countermeasures, and truthful-
ness in the GWOT.  Regardless of those revelations, the modern Court’s 
plodding slowness has certainly permitted the crisis mentality of 9/11 to 
dissipate and has allowed presidential steps and missteps to unfold as an 
ongoing aspect of litigation about military need and executive credibility.  
Such delays contradict the Court’s Korematsu-era approach, and they may 
have also influenced the Court’s twenty-first-century results. 
III. ENDING THE KOREMATSU ERA? 
Thus far, I have proposed that the Korematsu era is a vital category of 
Supreme Court precedent whose assumptions about institutional war pow-
ers have been undermined by recent case law.  This Part explores implica-
tions for future controversies over presidential authority.  There are always 
risks in seeking present-minded guidance from historical research.  In law, 
as in finance, past performance does not guarantee future results.281  None-
theless, this Part describes patterned experience from World War II and the 
GWOT that may carry lasting importance. 
Even this project of seeking present-day guidance is inspired by the 
past.  Consider a passage from Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent: “[The 
majority] argues that we are bound to uphold the conviction of Korematsu 
because we upheld one in Hirabayashi v. United States when we sustained 
[DeWitt’s military] orders in so far as they applied a curfew requirement to 
a citizen of Japanese ancestry.”282  Jackson did not respond as readers might 
expect.  He did not distinguish Hirabayashi and Korematsu, nor did he oth-
erwise justify his year-old, progovernment vote.283  Instead, Jackson said of 
Hirabayashi simply: “I think we should learn something from that expe-
rience.”284  On the assumption that studying the past affects how we perce-
ive the present, this Part considers what World War II and the GWOT 
 
281  Cf. GORDON S. WOOD, THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY 71 
(2008) (“History does not teach lots of little lessons.  Insofar as it teaches any lessons, it teaches only 
one big one: that nothing ever works out quite the way its managers intended or expected.  History is 
like experience and old age: wisdom is what one learns from it.”). 
282  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (citation omit-
ted). 
283  See supra Part I.A.1. 
284  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added). 
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indicate about the institutional role of courts and the cultural role of law re-
garding wartime detention and military commissions. 
A. “To Preclude Another Episode like the One Described in Korematsu”285 
One lesson concerns how to prevent “another Korematsu.”  Under a 
conventionally narrow interpretation, it seems impossible that wholesale 
racist internment of American citizens could happen again, so the notion of 
preventing “another” Korematsu is correspondingly absurd.286  By contrast, 
this Article’s broad view of Korematsu-era deference to executive war 
powers raises problems that exist today and are likely to recur.  Under this 
approach, the crucial Korematsu question is how courts can uphold legalist 
values in a wartime context when judicial competence is severely limited.  
Examples of executive abuse may take any number of forms, including go-
vernmental racism, uncharged detention, procedurally deficient trials and 
punishment, and other unforeseen, fundamental inequities.  But can courts 
do anything at all to stop them? 
Experiences from World War II and the GWOT confirm that national 
security issues and their effect on fundamental rights may be too important 
for Presidents to decide alone.287  Twentieth-century history illustrates that 
security crises impose predictably massive pressure on Presidents and other 
officials who struggle to keep their country strong and citizens safe without 
shredding constitutional liberties.  After surprise attacks like Pearl Harbor 
and 9/11, the government must respond quickly and decisively.  Mistakes 
will occur, individuals will be mistreated, and any belief that future Presi-
dents will ignore political pressures to defend the nation is as naïve as 
thinking that future crises will not arise at all.288 
The “Youngstown principle,” that Presidents must typically seek con-
gressional approval to support wartime activities, is an important prophy-
lactic against executive abuse.  But the Korematsu era shows that 
Youngstown’s political safeguards may not be enough.289  Congressional 
 
285  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 542 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment). 
286  Racist internment is inconceivable for almost countless reasons.  Modern technologies allow rel-
atively quick verification of data about personal identities thereby reducing any need to detain large 
numbers of innocents for long periods of time.  Modern politics and sociology have rendered the entire 
concept of racial classifications problematic because issues of multiraciality overlap with problems of 
visually interchangeable, variable, and indistinct “races.”  Finally, the legal world of Brown has raised 
the stakes of racial subordination to an exceedingly high level, making it extremely unlikely that any 
neoracist internment plan could be upheld. 
287  See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2. 
288  Cf. PHILIP BOBBITT, TERROR AND CONSENT: THE WARS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 404 
(2008) (“[I]n addition to stockpiling vaccines, we need to stockpile rules . . . to anticipate such a crisis, 
for that step too is a way of decreasing our vulnerabilities.”). 
289  Note that all of this Article’s Korematsu-era cases involve both Congress and the President 
working together.  See supra Part I.A–B. 
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judgment can be swayed by the same political winds that buffet Presidents, 
and Presidents can influence the timing and scope of legislative authoriza-
tion to suit their political objectives.290  Congressional action may occur be-
fore important facts are known, as happened with the AUMF and the 
MCA.291  And after a crisis, Congress may grant Presidents extremely broad 
authority, as when Congress in 1942 criminalized all violations of military 
orders that might be issued at some later date.292 
The Korematsu era highlights courts’ importance in these contexts.  
Judges cannot evaluate military reactions in real time, and they will always 
lack adequate information and expertise.  Yet ex post oversight of executive 
detention requires Presidents to explain what they have done before nonex-
pert judges in the face of lawyers’ counterarguments, and this supervision 
can limit abuse.  If a President uses congressionally authorized war powers 
wisely and credibly, then subsequent litigation should be relatively easy to 
win.  After all, judges are chosen by Presidents, and many Justices have 
their own experience in the Executive Branch.293  Such jurists understand 
their institutional limitations, and they appreciate a strong, secure America 
just like anyone else who wishes to stay safe and alive.  Presidents should 
expect any reasonable argument about national security or military necessi-
ty to receive a fair, if not generous, hearing before such tribunals . 
By contrast, twentieth- and twenty-first-century litigation suggests that 
problems arise when Presidents push their authority beyond what, in retros-
pect, was actually necessary, and this overreaching is when courts can play 
a tempering role.  As Souter wrote, “The defining character of American 
constitutional government is its constant tension between security and liber-
ty, serving both by partial helpings of each.”294  Without impugning particu-
lar Presidents’ motives or competence, history shows that the balance 
between such crucial values should not always be decided by the Executive 
without oversight from Congress and the courts as well. 
B. “Tools Belong to the Man Who Can Use Them”295 
Another lesson from sixty years of wartime case law concerns the role 
of judicial precedent itself in guiding presidential action.  Two viewpoints 
 
290  See Paul C. Light, The President’s Agenda: Notes on the Timing of Domestic Choice, 
11 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 67, 67 (1981). 
291  See supra Part II.B.5. 
292  Act of March 21, 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-503, 56 Stat. 173. 
293  Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why Some Republican 
Supreme Court Justices “Evolve” and Others Don’t?, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 457, 460–61 (2007) 
(discussing the Executive Branch experiences of Chief Justices Roberts, Rehnquist, and Burger, as well 
as of Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito). 
294  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, 
and concurring in the judgment). 
295  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (attribut-
ing the quotation to Napoleon). 
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merit notice, each having roots in opinions by Justice Jackson.  On one 
hand, consider his explanation in Korematsu for why courts must not ap-
prove illegal executive action: 
A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the 
military emergency. . . .  But once a judicial opinion . . . show[s] that the Con-
stitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the prin-
ciple of racial discrimination in criminal procedure and of transplanting 
American citizens.  The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon, ready 
for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an ur-
gent need.  Every repetition imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and 
thinking and expands it to new purposes. . . .  A military commander may 
overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we review 
and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.  
There it has a generative power of its own, and all that it creates will be in its 
own image.296 
This “loaded weapon” rhetoric is an orthodox element in analyzing Kore-
matsu as a racist morality play.  The passage is cited to show that Supreme 
Court precedents really matter and that racist errors retain their menacing 
power for generations.297  Students are reminded that Korematsu was never 
directly overruled, thereby inviting the vivid nightmare that the Court’s rul-
ing lies even now as a loaded weapon just waiting for some reckless Presi-
dent to grab and fire.298 
Jackson’s weaponized approach to precedent, however, is terribly 
flawed.  As we have seen, the first and decisive precedent supporting World 
War II’s racist policies was Hirabayashi and not Korematsu.  Thus, it was 
Jackson’s own majority vote in 1943 (Hirabayashi) that helped to “load” 
the doctrinal weapon over which his dissent fretted in 1944 (Korematsu).299  
Jackson’s willingness to disregard Hirabayashi a year later in Korematsu 
only illustrates the obvious truth that no judicial decision can decree a legal 
principle “for all time.”300  Past cases can be overruled, disfavored, ignored, 
or reinterpreted if the Court finds adequate reasons to do so, and this is ef-
fectively what happened to Korematsu and Hirabayashi in the wake of 
Brown, the Civil Rights era, and other modern history.301  To use Jackson’s 
language again, Korematsu was a “repetition” of Hirabayashi’s racism for 
“expand[ed]” purposes,302 yet such doctrinal expansion from racist curfew 
 
296  323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
297  See IRONS, supra note 35, at 366. 
298  Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395, 1425 (1999) (book review) 
(“This nation may again see a race-based evacuation or internment.  But Korematsu, although fallen 
from favor, has never been overruled—the weapon is still loaded and lying about.” (footnote omitted)). 
299  Compare Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104-05 (1943), with Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
246. 
300  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 264. 
301  See supra Part I.A.2. 
302  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 1036 
to racist reporting only pushed these two cases further toward their pariah 
status.303  I argue that similar revision and rejection has started (and should 
continue) in the context of presidential authority during wartime.  
A second perspective on judicial precedent concerns Jackson’s 
Youngstown concurrence, which rejected President Truman’s effort to seize 
steel mills and maintain output for the Korean War.304  Jackson’s famous 
opinion ends with less famous self-referential pessimism about judicial au-
thority itself: 
I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power in the hands 
of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its problems. . . .  If not 
good law, there was worldly wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that 
“The tools belong to the man who can use them.”  We may say that power to 
legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress 
itself can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.305 
This kind of “no illusion” realism about presidential authority characterizes 
judicial limits on the President as contingent on Congress’s political wis-
dom and responsiveness.  Here, one finds no bold talk from Jackson about 
precedents as “loaded weapons” or stalwart shields.  On the contrary, if tak-
en seriously, Jackson’s Youngstown opinion implies that judicial decisions 
about presidential wartime activities are insignificant: When Congress as-
serts its institutional prerogatives and uses them wisely, the Executive 
might be restrained, but the Court cannot do much to shift that political bal-
ance of power. 
Jackson’s hard-nosed analysis may seem intellectually bracing, but it 
understates the real-world power of judicial precedent to shape what is po-
litically possible.306  Although presidential speeches occasionally declare a 
willingness to disobey Supreme Court rulings, actual disobedience of this 
sort is rare and would carry grave political consequences.307  Even President 
 
303  See Muller, supra note 45, at 1–2.  The transition away from racism largely occurred during the 
decade immediately following Korematsu’s “loaded weapon” in 1944.  See, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497 (1954) (invalidating segregated public education in the District of Columbia); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating state systems of segregated public education); McLaurin 
v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (invalidating racially segregated graduate-
school classrooms); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (invalidating racially separate law schools); 
Sipuel v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (invalidating racist law school admis-
sions policy). 
304  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
305  Id. 
306  See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE 
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 296 (2007) 
(“Though chosen by presidents and confirmed by senators, the justices have been able to gain authority 
over the president and the Congress.  They have asserted the right to say what the Constitution means, 
and political leaders have generally chosen to respect that right.  Judicial supremacy is not intrinsic to 
the constitutional scheme, but it has often emerged out of it.”). 
307  See IRONS, supra note 35, at 153–54 (noting the surpassing rarity “in the history of the United 
States of armed revolt by the military against duly constituted judicial authority”). 
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Bush’s losses in the GWOT cases did not spur serious consideration of 
noncompliance despite broad support from a Republican Congress.308  
Likewise, from the perspective of strengthening presidential power, Kore-
matsu-era decisions emboldened President Bush in his twenty-first-century 
choices about Guantánamo and military commissions.309  Thus, the modern 
historical record shows that judicial precedent can both expand and restrict 
the political sphere of presidential action. 
The operative influence of judicial precedent is even stronger than a 
court-focused record might suggest, as the past sixty years have witnessed a 
massive bureaucratization and legalization of all levels of executive gov-
ernment.310  From the White House Counsel, to the Pentagon, to other enti-
ties addressing intelligence and national security issues, lawyers now 
occupy such high-level governmental posts that almost no significant policy 
is determined without multiple layers of legal review.311  And these execu-
tive lawyers are predominantly trained to think—whatever else they may 
believe—that Supreme Court precedent is authoritative and binding.312 
A middle ground seems necessary between Jackson’s “loaded weapon” 
and “no illusion” theories of precedent.  Although Supreme Court decisions 
may often influence the scope of presidential war powers, such practical in-
fluence is neither inexorable nor timeless.  A more accurate theory of war 
powers precedents would have to explain why the historical reservoir of 
Korematsu-era decisions supporting broad executive power continues to 
matter today, and it would also have to show how modern lawyers, judges, 
and scholars can eviscerate the force of such rulings under the proper cir-
cumstances. 
This Article seeks to apply such a middle-ground theory of precedent 
to the Korematsu era.  Everyone knows that Korematsu is wrong, yet like 
other legal icons—Marbury, Dred Scott, Lochner, Erie, and Brown—its ex-
act operative content is debatable.  Korematsu was once an authoritative 
precedent and is now discredited; this Article would revise Korematsu’s 
 
308  George W. Bush, The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of It-
aly in Rome (June 12, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?
pid=77487#axzz1OYDV0okv) (“First of all, [Boumediene is] the Supreme Court decision.  We’ll abide 
by the Court’s decision.  That doesn’t mean I have to agree with it.”); George W. Bush, The President’s 
News Conference with Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi of Japan (June 29, 2006) (transcript available 
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=256#axzz1OYDV0okv) (“I will protect the people 
and, at the same time, conform with the findings of the Supreme Court [in Hamdan].”). 
309  See supra Part II.A. 
310  See GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 64–70; Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 125, at 285–88. 
311  Cf. GOLDSMITH, supra note 18, at 91 (“[I]n the 1990s, the number of CIA lawyers rose and rose, 
and today stands at well over one hundred.  The number of lawyers in the Defense Department grew 
even more steeply . . . and today stands at over ten thousand . . . .”). 
312  Cf. id. at 81, 90 (“Roosevelt’s political conception of legal constraints had largely vanished, and 
by 2001 had been replaced by a fiercely legalistic conception of unprecedented wartime constraints on 
the presidency.”). 
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negative precedent even further, transforming it from an isolated decision 
about racial oppression to a broad analysis of interlocked judicial and presi-
dential power. 
Under a “loaded weapon” theory of timelessly fixed precedential 
meaning, my project might be impossible; and under Jackson’s “no illu-
sion” theory of politics, all precedential analysis wilts in the presence of po-
litical conflict.313  Between those extremes, however, if Korematsu is 
indelibly wrong but its scope and substance are changeable, then interpret-
ing the decision’s meaning could be important.  A culturally situated view 
of iconic cases suggests that Korematsu’s significance is a matter of doc-
trinal and historical exegesis, and any interpretation’s success must be 
measured by its influence on the current generation of scholars and com-
mentators, who will in turn guide the next cohort of lawyers and judges.314  
If our judges and executive lawyers of the future can be persuaded that Ko-
rematsu is not just a case of racist internment but represents an entire era of 
excessive judicial deference to military necessity, then that precedential and 
cultural truth may influence the next generation’s case law and presidential 
advice.  This is how iconic precedents function, and it is also why they are 
still worth fighting over.  To apply Jackson’s language one last time, the in-
fluential and malleable role of iconic precedents is another “something” 
“we should learn” from the Korematsu era and the GWOT.315 
IV. EPILOGUE: WHAT THE KOREMATSU ERA MEANS NOW 
Iconic war powers precedents offer special interpretive challenges be-
cause such cases arise only infrequently from clustered factual circums-
tances that differ greatly from any other group of cases.  The result is an 
uncommon risk that each generation of lawyers may forget or misread the 
wisdoms and follies of the past.  This is what happened before 9/11.  Law-
yers, judges, scholars, and commentators had not adequately appreciated the 
Court’s unfortunate history surrounding World War II.  As old issues resur-
faced concerning detention and military commissions, executive lawyers 
 
313  See supra notes 307–11 and accompanying text. 
314  Balkin & Levinson, supra note 24, at 30 (“Law professors exercise their control [over the legal 
canon] primarily through influence over their students and their fellow academics and through their 
work as legal advisors and advocates.  This influence is not insignificant: . . . the way in which constitu-
tional law is taught may affect the development of the constitutional doctrine.”); Balkin, supra note 11, 
at 682 (“[N]ew decisions and new events place older cases in new perspective.  They change our atti-
tudes both about the meaning of older decisions and their canonical status.  Over time, the dialectic of 
new theories interacting with new cases and new events reshapes the constitutional canon and our atti-
tudes about particular decisions from the past.”); Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and 
the Law in Lawyers’ Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1501 (1996) (describing how lawyers understand 
cases as “mental models” that are shared within legal communities and that “implicitly proclaim[] ‘this 
is how we do things’ (or, if the conversation should skip to a higher plane, ‘this is the right thing to 
do’).”). 
315  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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and federal courts of appeals used Korematsu-era precedents (though not 
Korematsu itself) as “positive” precedents instead of “negative” ones.  This 
was a mistake, as the modern Court has repeatedly held.  This Article seeks 
to bolster safeguards against presidential abuse and, at long last, to limit the 
Korematsu era’s influence.  But like everything else, such scholarship oper-
ates in a world of contingent circumstances where pens and ideas are only 
sometimes mightier than swords and the politics of war.316 
If my thesis is correct that the modern GWOT cases have undermined 
the Korematsu era’s institutional assumptions, the episodic nature of war 
powers cases creates pressure to solidify that interpretation quickly.  Elec-
tions have delivered a President with an arguably different view of presi-
dential power.317  And several new Justices now occupy the high bench—
with the especially notable departures of Justice Stevens, who personally 
witnessed the Korematsu era as a young man,318 and Justice Souter, whose 
Hamdi concurrence showed exceptional insight in analyzing past examples 
of war powers.  Our current cluster of wartime decisions might soon draw 
to a close, and if that happens, issues of executive detention and military 
commissions may once again drift out of focus. 
All too soon, it may be hard to remember the political pressures heaped 
on the Court in 2004, when it said “no” for the first time to a popular, self-
declared wartime President.  As memories fade, the modern Court’s re-
markable steps in rejecting Korematsu-era deference might be similarly 
forgotten or misconstrued.  Rasul might become a case “just” about federal 
habeas statutes, Hamdi “just” a set of divided opinions about enemy comba-
tants, Hamdan “just” an interpretation of the UCMJ, and Boumediene “just” 
a constitutional decision about Guantánamo Bay.  For anyone who wishes 
to celebrate the Korematsu era’s end, the time to determine the recent war 
powers cases’ meaning is now.  Otherwise, the Court’s subtle language and 
narrow holdings may allow future executive lawyers to deflect recent pre-
cedents and revive Korematsu-era principles that the 9/11 era has firmly 
and quietly laid to rest. 
 
316  Of course, law and politics are not always adverse to one another.  See Timothy Naftali, George 
W. Bush and the “War on Terror,” in THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 4, at 59, 87 (“A broad coalition of legalists and pragmatic realists, both within 
all three branches of the U.S. government and outside government, played a significant role in rolling 
back perceived excesses [in the GWOT] . . . .  This quiet rebellion . . . is not yet fully understood and 
deserves more study as more documents become available . . . .”). 
317  But cf. Zelizer, supra note 4, at 36–37 (“[T]here is still minimal evidence that Obama will sub-
stantially roll back the gains in presidential power.  Of note, it has been extremely rare for presidents in 
the postwar period to voluntarily relinquish power.”). 
318  Laura Krugman Ray, Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. 
Rutledge, 41 CONN. L. REV. 211, 234–46 (2008). 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXTBOOKS DISCUSSING KOREMATSU 
Year (Author) Is any 
Korematsu-era 
















1985 (Gunther)319 N Y N 
1991 (Gunther)320 N Y N 
1996 (Stone)321 N Y N 
1996 (Brest)322 N Y N 
1997 (Gunther)323 N Y N 
2000 (Brest)324 N Y N 
2001 (Gunther)325 N Y N 
2001 (Stone)326 N Y N 
2004 (Gunther)327 Y Y Y 
2005 (Chemerinsky)328 Y Y N 
2005 (Stone)329 Y Y Y 
2009 (Chemerinsky)330 Y Y N 
 
319  GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (11th ed. 1985). 
320  GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (12th ed. 1991). 
321  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996). 
322  PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (3d ed. 1996). 
323  GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th ed. 1997). 
324  PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (4th ed. 2000). 
325  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed. 2001). 
326  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2001). 
327  KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (15th ed. 2004). 
328  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2005). 
329  GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (5th ed. 2005). 
105:983  (2011) Ending the Korematsu Era 
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APPENDIX B 
Lexis Search Terms 
(entered in database “Law Reviews, 








(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
(executive detention or wartime 
detention or military commission or 
military tribunal) 
238 1635 
atl3(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
(executive detention or wartime 
detention or military commission or 
military tribunal) 
117 1002 
atl4(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
(executive detention or wartime 
detention or military commission or 
military tribunal) 
98 843 
atl5(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
(executive detention or wartime 
detention or military commission or 
military tribunal) 
78 749 
(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
atl5(executive detention or wartime 
detention or military commission or 
military tribunal) 
88 908 
atl5(Korematsu or Hirabayashi or 
Eisentrager or Quirin or Yamashita) and 
atl5(executive detention or wartime 






330  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2009). 
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